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STEPIFICATION
Mitchell Chervu Johnston
ABSTRACT—Multistep tests pervade the law to the point that they appear to
be a fundamental feature of legal reasoning. Famous doctrines such as
Chevron or qualified immunity take this form, as do more obscure doctrinal
formulas. But surprisingly, these doctrinal formulations as a class are
relatively new. The reality is that the intellectual moment that gave rise to
Chevron was one in which multiple older doctrines that relied on multifactor
balancing were replaced by new tests formulated as multistep inquiries in
which each step was a discrete inquiry.
This Article provides the first historical and normative account of this
phenomenon—which I refer to as “stepification.” It charts both the rise of
the new multistep tests as well as the intellectual climate that gave birth to
these formulations, offering a theory of why courts chose to reorganize the
law in this way at the time they did. Additionally, it argues that there are
transsubstantive normative advantages and disadvantages to this mode of
organizing doctrine, and it offers an accounting of the implications of
historical stepification. In doing so, this Article aims to shed light on a
historical phenomenon and on trends in modern legal disputes (such as recent
cases over partisan gerrymandering and the future of Auer) that illustrate the
work that stepification continues to do within our legal culture.
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INTRODUCTION
Two Terms ago, in Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court decided whether
to jettison the Auer deference doctrine.1 Auer had answered the question of
how to address agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations: first, a
reviewing court was to ask whether the regulation is ambiguous, and second,
if there is ambiguity, the court was to ask whether the interpretation is
consistent with the regulation.2 One might think the Auer test has a problem:
it allows the agency to issue an ambiguous regulation and then to later clarify
it via a less rigorous process.3 The petitioners in Kisor therefore asked the
1 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (rejecting a challenge to the Court’s precedents, which held that courts
should defer to an agency’s reasonable reading of its own genuinely ambiguous regulation).
2 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Auer does not precisely use this language, but this
is essentially its test. Auer requires that the interpretation not be “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.” Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
This articulation in essence requires there to be room for interpretation—the regulation is ambiguous—
and that the agency’s interpretation not be erroneous or inconsistent—that it is reasonable.
3 See Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“But when an agency interprets its own rules—that is something else. Then the power
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Court to replace Auer with the more amorphous Skidmore deference, which
weighs the views of the agency based on a variety of factors.4 In short, they
wanted to replace the two-step test, which they argued placed a “heavy
weight on the scale[]” in favor of the agency, with a more flexible test.5 The
Court, however, did no such thing. Instead, it added more steps; the new Auer
test arguably has five steps.6 While the decision likely limits the reach of
Auer, it is a triumph for the use of multistep tests to shape the law.
Multistep tests like Auer pervade the law. They structure decision
procedures in administrative law, 7 federal jurisdiction, 8 the Establishment
Clause,9 World Trade Organization disputes, 10 and beyond. 11 Tests of this
to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely and broadly, so
as to retain a ‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive effect.”). For a recent review of
the literature critiquing Auer, see generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron
Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–10 (2018).
4 See Brief for Petitioner at 43, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”);
see also infra Section III.A (discussing Skidmore in contrast with Chevron deference).
5 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 43.
6 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–17 (stating that Auer deference should only be afforded to
interpretations of regulations when: (1) the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, (2) the interpretation is
reasonable, (3) the interpretation is “one actually made by the agency,” (4) the interpretation actually
implicates the agency’s “substantive expertise,” and (5) the “agency’s reading of [the] rule . . . reflect[s]
‘fair and considered judgment’” (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155
(2012))); see also Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor Means for the Future of Auer Deference: The New
Five-Step Kisor Deference Doctrine, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 26, 2019),
https://yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-future-of-auer-deference-the-new-five-step-kisordeference-doctrine [https://perma.cc/4EPX-7RU9] (summarizing the Kisor decision). The Chief Justice’s
concurrence reiterated this seemingly multistep test for applying Auer, stating that for deference to apply
“[t]he underlying regulation must be genuinely ambiguous; the agency’s interpretation must be
reasonable and must reflect its authoritative, expertise-based, and fair and considered judgment; and the
agency must take account of reliance interests and avoid unfair surprise.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part).
7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (articulating a
two-step test for deference to executive interpretation of the law).
8 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S 473, 477–78 (1981) (articulating a three-step test
for rebutting the presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
459–60 (1990) (affirming the three-step test for rebutting the presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction
in Gulf Offshore).
9 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (articulating a three-prong test for determining
violations of the Establishment Clause).
10
See Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO’s Two Step Test for Environmental Measures Under Article
XX, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 117, 119 (2007).
11 See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (articulating a twostep test for extraterritoriality); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 76–
80 (2012) (articulating a two-step test for determining whether an invention is sufficiently transformative
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sort are so common that they can feel like a feature of law itself rather than
a particular choice that has been made by judges to shape jurisprudence.
Despite their apparent timelessness, however, the evolution of multistep tests
and, in particular, the rhetoric of these tests is a relatively new and understudied phenomenon in American legal culture.12
Further, while the subject of multistep procedural processes has been
studied by Professor Louis Kaplow,13 there has been little attention to the
evolution of these sequential procedures within doctrine itself.14 While the
logic of multistep doctrinal tests may resemble the best rationale for
multistage adjudication—in the sense that both proceduralize decisions
further—I believe the normative implications are importantly different.15
Many areas of law have undergone the process of what I call
“stepification,” in which balancing tests are converted into multistep
inquiries. In multistep inquiries, the legal decision-maker must answer a
series of yes–no questions in which a “wrong” answer at any step terminates
the inquiry. This is in contrast to tests that require balancing a set of factors
or applying a standard—as opposed to a rule—to the conduct in question.16
so as to be a patentable application of natural laws or abstract ideas); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
80 (1986) (articulating a three-step inquiry for racial bias in peremptory strikes). These tests are not only
created at the Supreme Court level. See, e.g., Disability Rights Mont. v. Batista, 930 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2019) (applying a two-prong inquiry to assess whether prison policies violate the Eighth
Amendment). They are also sometimes recommended as a solution to issues that have at times vexed
courts. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2144
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (recommending a two-step
procedure for statutory interpretation); Daniel B. Listwa, Cooperative Covenants: Good Faith for the
Alternative Entity, 24 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 137, 159–170 (2019) (proposing a three-step framework for
contract interpretation); Janice M. Mueller, Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Computer/User Interfaces, 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 37, 47 (1989) (proposing “a two-step test for infringement
analysis in a computer/user interface copyright infringement case”); James Durling, Comment, The
Intercircuit Exclusionary Rule, 128 YALE L.J. 231, 248 (2018) (recommending a three-step framework
for addressing issues of intercircuit exclusion).
12 See infra Section II.A (charting the rise of “stepified” language over time).
13 See Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1186–87 (2013) (studying
the nature of procedural processes that test claims at multiple points—for example, with motions to
dismiss and summary judgment—and providing a framework to evaluate such procedures).
14 In particular, Professor Kaplow’s work looks at procedures that test claims at multiple points in
time with different substantive standards. My work here looks at how judges formulate sequential tests
to evaluate one issue at one time.
15 In an important sense, both might flow from a common appreciation of a certain proceduralized
aesthetic. Both seek to slice and dice some legal space in a sequential way via regulated decision points.
In this sense, a connection might be drawn to Professor Pierre Schlag’s discussion of the “grid aesthetic”
in American law. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051 (2002).
Stepification, in my telling, is related to the same impulse that animates the desire for grids. Id. (“The
grid aesthetic is the aesthetic of bright-line rules, absolutist approaches, and categorical definitions.”).
16 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 258–59 (1974) (explaining the distinction between rules and standards and how the distinction
is somewhat artificial).
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For example, the famous Chevron two-step test asks courts first to
consider whether the statutory term is ambiguous. 17 An answer of no results
in a loss for the government. But, if the answer to the first question is yes,
the court subsequently asks whether the government interpretation is
reasonable.18 If the answer is no, the government loses at this second step. If
the answer is yes, the government passes the test. Just like Professor
Kaplow’s structured procedures, each step is dispositive, but there is no final
balancing inquiry.19 Thus, step tests take the form of a sequence of questions
that are theoretically independent of one another. The answer to one question
does not affect the analysis of the others, though it may obviate the need to
answer further questions.
Whether a test has undergone stepification is a distinct question from
whether the test takes the form of a rule or a standard.20 As illustrated by
Chevron, a two-step test can be two standards linked together. Neither of the
Chevron steps is “rule-like” in practice. Therefore, to the extent that the step
test converts the standards in question into a doctrinal approach that appears
more rule-like, this effect is independent of whether the individual steps are
actually rule-like themselves. But critically, for this reason, I do not want to
make the claim that the rules versus standards debate is irrelevant to my
inquiry. 21 To the extent stepification makes doctrine more rule-like, the
general arguments in favor of rules over standards will be closely related to
the merits or drawbacks of the shift to multistep tests.
Furthermore, in a recent pair of insightful articles, Professor Kaplow
has endeavored to study and critique what he terms “structured decision
procedures,” in which the court engages in a multistep inquiry rather than a

17

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Id.
19 See Kaplow, supra note 13, at 1293.
20 Briefly, standards are typically defined as open-ended directives that allow for later
characterization of a variety of circumstances (for example, “drivers should drive at a reasonable speed
given the circumstances”), whereas rules restrict the decision-maker significantly, perhaps to a single
empirical fact (for example, “drivers should not exceed fifty-five miles per hour”). See Ehrlich & Posner,
supra note 16, at 257. As Ehrlich and Posner acknowledge, this is not a sharp distinction but a matter of
degree. Id. at 258.
21 See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG & AMY J. GRIFFIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH LEGAL DOCTRINE 100–
18 (2020) (providing a critical overview of the distinction and an analysis of its recurrence within legal
theory); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 16, at 258, 261–280 (defining rules and standards and providing
an economic analysis of the optimal choice for policymakers); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561–65 (1992) (providing an alternative overview of this
debate); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687–1701 (1976) (discussing the jurisprudence of rules, “premised on the notion that the choice between
standards and rules of different degrees of generality is significant”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–69 (1992)
(discussing arguments for choosing a rule over a standard and vice versa).
18
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balancing procedure. 22 In particular, Professor Kaplow analyzes decision
procedures that can be stylized in the following way: first, does the harm to
the plaintiff exceed some threshold; second, if so, does the benefit of the
action to the defendant equal some threshold; and finally, if steps one and
two are satisfied, is the harm greater than the benefit.23 He further notes that
many tests take this exact form or a related form. My goal here is to expand
on Professor Kaplow’s observations in two ways. First, I aim to study a
broader class of multistep tests, not all of which take the form that Professor
Kaplow studies, such as Chevron. Second, when the focus is expanded, I find
that a historical trend towards multistep tests can be observed, one perhaps
driven by concerns with balancing summarized by Professor Kaplow.24
This Article aims to provide the first comprehensive study of the
process of stepification as well as its normative implications. In doing so, it
makes two claims. The first is a descriptive and historical one, and the second
is a normative commentary. The process of stepification, and the degree to
which it has permeated U.S. law, is relatively new. In particular, the tendency
of courts to speak of multistep tests seems to have begun in the 1970s and
’80s, and the volume of cases using this language has grown steadily over
time. 25 Although it is impossible to draw precise conclusions about the
intentions of the disparate group of judges and lawmakers who built the
stepified regime, evidence suggests that stepification should be understood
as a response to discomfort with judicial discretion—a discomfort that
resulted in a move to proceduralize the law. As Chief Justice John Roberts
argued in June Medical Services, balancing can make equal treatment
impossible because it asks judges to act as legislators.26
Moreover, stepification emerged at the same time that several other
formalistic trends among American elites took hold, offering clues about
why this particular legal form emerged.27 Stepification was a response to a
desire among judges to portray the law as more formalistic and rule-bound

22 See Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII
Disparate Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2019)
[hereinafter Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures]; Louis Kaplow, On the Design
of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992, 993 (2019)
[hereinafter Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules].
23 Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules, supra note 22, at 993–94.
24 Id. at 1047–55.
25 See infra Section II.B.
26 June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
27 See infra Section II.B.2; cf. David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha, Anti-Modalities, 119 MICH. L.
REV. 729, 781 (2021) (arguing that judges and lawyers exclude certain forms of argument as a way to
maintain the legitimacy of the law as a discipline separate from politics).
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than it may have previously seemed under regimes that favored multifactor
balancing tests.
Thus, although much has been written about whether individual
stepwise tests had an impact on the law and whether they remain relevant,
these tests are best understood as a unified whole, part of a single historical
trend rather than isolated changes in the law.28 Regardless of the merits of
Chevron, it is part of a broader trend in American jurisprudence.29 This story
has not yet been told in the legal literature. This Article aims to fill that gap.
As a final observation, while this Article makes the claim that stepification
as a historical phenomenon is an important and novel trend in several ways,
my claim is not that the notion of steps in the law is itself new. Such a claim
would almost certainly be false. For example, a negligence claim requires
(1) a duty to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) a
harm.30
Parts I, II, and III chart the history of multistep tests. Part I offers a
definition of stepification and distinguishes it from older legal forms that
resemble multistep reasoning. Part II then examines trends in the language
of stepification over time. It shows that courts have dramatically increased
the degree to which they frame inquiries as stepified tests, which suggests a
proliferation of these tests in important areas of law. Part II argues that this
trend was driven both by desires to constrain judicial decision-making as
well as by a broader movement among American elites towards gametheoretic and decision-theoretic analyses. 31 Part III then discusses several
case studies of the stepification process to show the universal qualities of
these tests and their relevance to important areas of the law.
The second claim of the Article comes as a normative commentary on
the character of stepified tests themselves. In Part IV, I argue that, seen as a
group, these tests have both advantages and disadvantages as legal
instruments. But while they may have their own individual dynamics and
may be better suited to one doctrinal area or another, stepified tests have
transsubstantive normative implications that apply broadly across their
various manifestations.

28 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 169 (differing over whether Chevron deference has actually
altered the outcome of cases).
29 For a discussion of the specific case of Chevron, see infra Section III.A.
30 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–100 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that a
plaintiff must show that there was a duty to her as well a breach of that duty).
31 As I discuss in infra Section II.B, it is difficult to draw out the precise mix of these two factors,
and therefore, without further empirical study, I am limited to providing suggestive evidence rather than
concrete conclusions in this area.
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I argue that stepification has important virtues. Stepified tests can
increase the perception of the law as “lawlike” and hence can increase the
perceived legitimacy of the judiciary. Similarly, each stepified test provides
a structured framework for debate on a given topic, organizing legal
argumentation as well as providing templates for decision-makers to explain
their decisions. Unlike balancing tests, winners and losers in a stepified
system can more easily understand the outcome even if they disagree with
the conclusion. Finally, stepified tests can function as an effective means to
organize and funnel lower court discretion and to make easy cases easy. They
can provide clear instructions to lower courts on how to resolve cases and
enhance predictability in certain circumstances.32
That said, the implications of stepification are different from the merits
and drawbacks of bright-line rules in some important ways. Multistep tests
implicitly presume a particular normative structure that differs from that
assumed by bright-line rules. 33 Further, multistep tests may conceal
ambiguity that bright-line rules exist to strip out entirely. This might, I argue,
make them inherently unstable in a particular way where that ambiguity
requires ever more steps to be added to bring the doctrine into compliance
with the appellate court’s view of the appropriate state of the law.34 Again, I
do not want to argue that a gulf necessarily exists—stepification may in fact
help make a doctrine resemble a bright-line rule in some ways—only that
there are important differences worthy of consideration.35
Part IV also offers a commentary on the inherent instability of step tests
and argues that because they flatten important normative issues, they must
contort themselves over time to adjust to difficulties.36 Although these issues
can be relatively minor in some cases, in areas in which the normative stakes
are higher, over-stepification can result in a breakdown of the legal regime
in question and an end to the step test itself.37 Part V then posits a tentative
theory of the life and death of these tests over time. It argues that these tests’
32

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
34 See infra Part V.
35 Cf. infra Section IV.A (arguing that multistep tests lead to a different pattern of precedent
formation).
36 In this sense, there may be a connection to Professor Frederick Schauer’s observation that hard
rules “may have their edges rounded” over time as they are applied or interpreted via the creation of
exceptions or selective overriding. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 804–05 (2005). I am indebted to Michael Coenen for
suggesting this article.
37 Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of
Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1821–22 (2016) (arguing that prescriptive legal theories in
general often “work themselves impure” by becoming both more complicated and more compromised
over time as a result of the normative challenges they encounter).
33
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structure can be their undoing when subsequent cases put stress on the
weaknesses their rigidity creates.
Ultimately, I do not declare definitively whether stepification is (and
was) good or bad. Rather, the normative desirability of stepification is highly
contextual. Just as there is no single answer to whether rules or standards are
superior, or whether default rules should always be preferred to mandatory
rules, there is no one answer to whether stepification is always positive or
negative. Still, a common framework of considerations governs the
evaluation of individual multistep tests; only once such jurisprudential
moves are seen as a single trend rather than as individual doctrinal
innovations do these dynamics come into view. The goal of this Article is to
provide this framework to evaluate the merits of individual instances of
stepification.
I.

THE SPREAD OF STEPIFICATION

In some sense, the existence of multistep tests across the law should not
be very surprising. Stepified tests are ways of codifying a decision-tree
process. Therefore, it is not shocking that they exist in the law, which
searches for ways to organize discretion and make decisions in a structured
and consistent way.38
But concluding that multistep tests have always been with us is a
mistake. In particular, historical inquiry reveals that the language of
stepification is a rather recent phenomenon, beginning in the 1970s and ’80s.
Moreover, stepification is a process that has occurred over time in various
legal areas, converting previous modes of analysis into multistep tests. It can
also include instances of courts adding additional steps to the inquiry in
response to later imperfections in the test. This Part claims that when seen in
proper context, stepification is a process that is worthy of study in its own
right as a unified legal phenomenon, rather than as isolated incidents of
doctrinal change.
This Part aims to make this claim in two Sections. The first Section
works to define the notion of stepification and to clarify its relationship to
the traditional debate over rules and standards. The second then addresses a
threshold objection to my thesis—namely, that multistep tests have always
been with us and so the change is illusory.
A. Defining Stepification
I use “stepification” to refer to a process by which the law is formalized
into the language of multistep tests and has moved away from other forms of
38

See infra Section IV.A.
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inquiry. Thus, inquiries that have long been multistep—for example, asking
whether the defendant committed the actus reus with the appropriate mens
rea—do not fit within my thesis. In contrast, I focus on tests that have
become stepified over time, such as the sliding-scale regime of Skidmore
eventually becoming formalized into the Chevron two-step test, with further
steps added over time.39
For the purposes of this Article, I also mean to define a multistep test
as one in which the decision-maker proceeds through a series of questions
that are phrased as yes–no inquiries. Typically, at each stage, a particular
answer can terminate the inquiry. For example, if the government fails at
Step One of the Chevron analysis, then the inquiry is over.40 Therefore, in a
case involving a multistep test, the plaintiff or defendant can fail at any
individual step of the inquiry.
That said, I do not want to entirely exclude from my focus what might
be called “threshold” steps. While much of the argumentation here is focused
on dispositive steps as part of answering a particular legal question, I also
recognize that frequently, the language of steps is used to describe the
question of whether or not to apply a given doctrine at all—for example, the
so-called “Step Zero” of Chevron.41 In fact, implicit step tests are a constant
in the law. For example, a court might ask first whether there is an actual
contract at all before then asking whether the contract is unconscionable.
Similarly, a court must first address whether something is speech before
applying First Amendment protections.42 Because courts must always decide
which regime applies before applying it—a step zero inquiry—there is
always an implicit step test at work even if it is not styled as such. These
steps, too, might have some of the merits and demerits discussed in Part IV
insofar as they also represent on–off switches that presume a line can be
drawn where one doctrine ends and the other begins.
Further, note that this definition does not require the court to explicitly
use the language of “steps” for a test to take this form, though I use this
39

See infra Section III.A.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (asking first
whether the statute is ambiguous or silent on a given point).
41 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873 (2001)
(coining the term “step zero” to describe “the inquiry that courts should undertake before moving on to
step one of Chevron, or turning instead to Skidmore (or resolving the issue de novo)”).
42 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408–10 (1974) (engaging in the threshold inquiry of
whether the individual’s communicative action fell “within the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments”). Similarly, a court must decide whether a “seizure” has occurred before analyzing whether
it was “unreasonable” and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. See Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989,
1003 (2021) (holding that “the application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain
is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued” but noting that questions of
reasonableness remain to be decided).
40
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language as a proxy for the practice later and show that the use of such
language has increased.43 That said, how these tests are described is relevant.
How the law is articulated is important even if the test is the same. Still,
stepification can occur even if the word “step” is not initially used—though
later courts may use this language. For example, the Chevron opinion itself
does not use the word “step” or “prong” even as later commentators and
judges have summarized it as creating a two-step test.44
The form of the multistep test will sometimes vary depending on the
work the steps do in each case. For example, if a step test requires that two
conditions be met, then it may allow judges to dodge a question by finding
that only one prong is relevant.45 Alternatively, the inquiry can be more rigid,
with one step necessarily following the other, as in Chevron, where it will
frequently make little sense to resolve the second inquiry before the first.46
This Article’s conclusions aim to discuss issues common to all multistep
tests, but even within this family, there are important variations that will alter
how my conclusions apply.
In sum, stepification is the conversion of either an open-ended standard
or a multifactor balancing test into a multistep test, in which each step is
potentially dispositive for the question. The individual steps need not have
any strict sequencing, nor any relationship to previous steps. Furthermore,
while the rhetoric of multistep tests matters, I do not require that the initial
court that formulated the test refer to it explicitly in the language as steps,
only that later interpreters do so consistently.
But the caveat that many legal inquiries seem to have a natural multistep
structure raises a threshold objection to my thesis: Haven’t multistep tests
always been with us? While the data presented later may demonstrate a rise
in the language of multistep tests, this shift may only be rhetorical or, more
directly, a distinction without a difference. 47 But I argue both that the
multistep analyses found in private law have spread over time into public
law and that the rhetorical shift from balancing to multistep tests is
important, even if it ultimately crafts doctrine that reaches the same result.
The next Section explicates these responses.
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See infra Section II.A.
See 467 U.S. at 843–44.
45 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009) (holding that the mandatory two-step
process announced in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), should be optional); see also infra Section
II.B.
46 Of course, an interpretation could be “reasonable” without a provision being ambiguous in theory.
However, this circumstance is unlikely to generate litigation.
47 See infra Section II.B (chronicling the rise in the number of cases using the language of multistep
tests over time).
44
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B. A Threshold Objection: Just Words?
Other legal inquiries present themselves as multistep inquiries as well.
Again, tort analysis asks us to look for (1) a duty, (2) a breach of that duty,
(3) causation, and (4) harm. Similarly, criminal law often asks us to look for
(1) the actus reus and then (2) whether the act was taken with the requisite
mens rea.48 I do not deny (how could I?) that these are examples of multistep
reasoning. Still, there are two reasons that this observation does not
undermine my claim that stepification began in earnest in the 1970s and ’80s
and that its implications are normatively significant.
First, what sets stepification apart as a distinct, modern phenomenon is
that it captures the migration of the traditional common law multistep
inquiries into the realm of public law. As the data in the Appendix show, the
growth in federal court discussion of multistep tests is not the result of an
increase in tort analysis. Instead, legal issues such as personal jurisdiction
and qualified immunity have acquired this structure. The notion of a
multistep analysis has been moved over to these areas.
It would be one thing if multistep reasoning were somehow necessary
to the analysis of these new areas, but it is not in two important ways. The
first is that in many cases, the law previously lacked a multistep character.49
Thus, in Chevron, the two-step analysis replaced an earlier balancing inquiry
that looked to evaluate how convincing the agency’s reasoning was. 50
Similarly, the defense of qualified immunity could have remained a defense
of good faith. In Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court originally justified
immunity based on the common law defense of “good faith and probable
cause” in false arrest and imprisonment actions.51 It was only by departing
from this formulation that the modern two-step test emerged.52
Critically, the separation is artificial in an important sense, rather than
a natural feature of the analytical problem. While the modern formulations
of these doctrines can feel natural, it is by no means clear that they needed
to be structured as multistep tests. In contrast, the criminal law’s focus on
both acts and mental states will all but require something that might resemble
a two-step inquiry into each issue separately.53 We know that the issue of
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See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01.1, 2.02.1 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
See infra Part II (discussing trends in multistep tests over time); see also infra Part III (discussing
specific examples).
50 See infra Section III.A.
51 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
52 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982).
53 That said, while two steps are required for a finding of liability, degree does matter in criminal
law. For example, which mens rea is shown will alter the nature of which homicide offense a defendant
is guilty of. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1–.4.
49
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deference to agency statutory interpretation does not require such a structure
because it was not always so. This is not to say that the multistep version of
these doctrines does not perform better or that their evolution in a stepwise
direction was not in response to real deficiencies in the previous doctrinal
regime.54 But the existence of other nonstepified approaches demonstrates
that the structure of the underlying issue does not directly require this
approach. The move to make this separation is therefore normatively
significant, even if other inquiries have this structure naturally.
A second point worth making here is that in many cases there is no need
to even articulate the new doctrine in the language of steps. Professors
Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule have, for example, convincingly
argued that Chevron has only one step.55 Similarly, qualified immunity could
seemingly be framed as a one-step inquiry into whether an officer “violated
clearly-established constitutional rights.” 56 While this is not true of all
multistep tests, the ability to collapse some steps in this way suggests that in
certain cases, the introduction of a multistep structure is a conscious
rhetorical choice by courts rather than a change made out of necessity.
The first way to respond to the objection that stepification is nothing
but a change in terminology is to observe that stepification captures a process
by which courts adapt multistep thinking from other areas of the law and
move it into new areas. The question then becomes why judges did so
starting in the 1970s. As the data in Part II show, it is not as though courts
immediately seized on multistep reasoning in the common law and used it to
create multistep doctrines in other areas of the law. Before 1950, the
language of multistep tests was essentially absent from case law.57 Rather,
the move to separate inquiries into multistep tests was responsive to a desire
among lawyers to make the law more rule-like by adding analytical
structure.58 Stepification lent itself naturally to this process in cases where
the law could not be neatly converted into bright-line rules. Even if
stepification were equivalent to a one-step standard, it served an important
rhetorical function.
This leads to the second response to the objection: the language of the
law matters. That is, rhetorical shifts are important even if they have little
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For a discussion of the general benefits and costs of stepification, see infra Section IV.A.
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597,
598–600 (2009).
56 This is contrary to the current formulation of qualified immunity that first asks whether a right has
been violated, and then asks whether that right was clearly established. See District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018).
57 See infra Section II.A.
58 See infra Section II.B.
55
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effect on whether Smith or Jones wins the case. The language judges use to
justify their decisions affects the legitimacy of those decisions and how the
audiences of opinions process the outcome. While a realist might point out
that it likely makes little difference whether Chevron has one or two steps,
that does not mean the form has no impact beyond the resolution of
individual cases.59
Additionally, the formalization of reasoning into something that has a
name—a two-step test—may provide fertile ground for that form of labeling
to grow. To the extent that a line can be drawn between different doctrines
that unites them, that way of formulating the law may become more
attractive to courts or lawyers looking to label their work.
To be sure, I believe that the use of the multistep form does have direct
implications for how the judiciary operates.60 In particular, I argue that the
rigidity of multistep tests both makes certain decisions easier—an
advantage—and creates problems elsewhere where the rigidity of the tests is
overinclusive or underinclusive.
An observer should care about stepification because of its effect on the
language of the law. In particular, the shift may suggest influences on the
law and legal thinking from extralegal sources.61 The language of multistep
tests may further influence how observers perceive the work of judges. Both
are reasons to care about the trend, even if its impact on case-by-case
adjudication is negligible. The next Part turns to providing a historical
perspective on this trend.
II. STEPIFICATION OVER TIME
Stepification would be interesting as a matter of normative inquiry even
if it had always been a feature of American law. Once stepification is seen
in a broader historical context, however, it becomes more interesting as a
jurisprudential matter. Indeed, looking at the data available, stepification, or
at least the language of stepification, is a recent phenomenon in American
law, not one with an extensive historical pedigree.
What is telling is that the number of cases using the specific language
of steps has exploded over time. For example, between 1960 and 1970,62
thirty-six federal cases use language indicating the use of a two- or three-

59 For an examination of Chevron in particular, see Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two
Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 608 (2014).
60 See infra Part IV.
61 See infra Section II.B (discussing how stepification may be the result of external shifts in American
culture).
62 The dates were filtered between January 1, 1960 and December 31, 1969.
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step test.63 In contrast, in the same period between 1990 and 2000 there were
5,380 cases using the same language. By the decade between 2000 and 2010,
the number was 14,538. In total, a search of the Lexis database for terms
associated with stepification reveals 61,247 federal cases that are framed as
either two- or three-step tests.
While some of this growth can be attributed to famous two- and threestep tests that were articulated during this period, such as Chevron 64 and
Saucier, 65 that does not explain the entire deviation. 66 The data in the
Appendix support this conclusion, with only thirteen qualified immunity
cases and three Chevron cases out of the random sample of 100 published
cases.67 Further, no alternative line of cases leaps out as being the lion’s share
of the published multistep cases. Instead, even after excluding multistep tests
imposed by regulation, the random sample includes sixty-eight different
doctrines taking a multistep form. It appears then that the process of
stepification was the result of a general intellectual trend in the judiciary.
Famous multistep tests were merely part of a broader shift.
Before moving on, I want to make a note on methodology. My goal for
the various numbers in this Part (and in the Appendix) is to provide a
suggestive quantitative picture of stepification. Given the large number of
cases, it is impossible to verify that each case found via text searching
actually applies a multistep analysis. In some cases, the judge may not say
specific magic words, making the search underinclusive, and in others the
court may apply a statutory test, making the search overinclusive.
After experimenting with search terms, I chose a term that seemed to
capture a large share of tests without being overinclusive. Given that my goal
is to demonstrate the rise of stepification, underinclusivity was preferable to
a search that would pick up false positives. The data in the Appendix verify
this understanding, with ninety-four of the 100 tests analyzed being
examples of judge-made tests. Similarly, to avoid overinclusivity, I chose to
exclude tests of four or more steps as they risked being either statutory or
63 Searches were performed on Lexis due to its willingness to show the total search results even for
large values. In particular, the search term used was “opinion((TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1
(TEST or INQUIRY)).” Results were then filtered by the date.
All searches, except those described in the Appendix, were performed on July 24, 2021. Because
Lexis periodically adds to its database, readers attempting to replicate these searches may get slightly
different numbers. Records of the searches are on file with the journal.
64 See infra Section III.A.
65 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Note that while Pearson relaxed the mandatory order
of the inquiry, it did not eliminate the two-prong inquiry.
66 The difference is also surely due to the growth in the number of total cases. However, this cannot
explain the deviation.
67 Taking a 95% confidence interval for the total number of Chevron or qualified immunity cases in
the total population gives a range of 7.9% to 22.4%.
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regulatory creations or being balancing tests described in the language of
multistep tests.68 Finally, to verify that the data here are not an artifact of the
growing number of cases, Figure 2 controls using a proxy for the number of
cases in the database and shows that the trend is robust to restricting our
attention to multistep tests as a fraction of cases.69
The remainder of this Part aims to analyze this trend in two Sections.
First, it looks at the history of the language of stepification over time, taking
a high-level overview of the appearance of these terms in reported cases. It
then attempts to provide an explanation for these trends by examining
potential internal and external stories that tell why stepification arose at the
time it did. Still, the goal of this Part is not to offer a definitive historical or
empirical analysis of this trend. Rather, my claim is limited to the idea that,
whatever implicit steps have always existed in the law, the rise of the
language of stepification is a recent trend, not a constant of legal analysis.
That is to say, while multistep tests may seem to be omnipresent, they are in
fact a creation of the current legal moment.
A. The Evolution of Stepification
Upon looking at the data, what is striking is the shocking absence of
multistep or multiprong language in the earlier parts of legal history. A
search of the Lexis database for terms associated with stepification reveals
61,247 federal cases (14,568 published) that frame their inquiries as two- or
three-step tests.70 However, limiting the search to the period from 1875 to
1950 reveals only one case, state or federal, that uses this terminology.71 The
remainder of this Section proceeds to evaluate this shift in the number of
68

Moreover, adding a greater number of steps to the analysis did not change the result much. When
the search string was changed to “opinion((TWO or THREE or FOUR) /1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1 (TEST or
INQUIRY)),” the total number increased to only 64,022 cases in Lexis.
69 Based on the helpful advice of the Yale Law School research librarians, I looked for cases with at
least four uses of the word “the.” The goal was to exclude orders that might be coded as cases in the
database (for example, grants of the writ of certiorari) while still capturing the majority of cases.
70
Returning again to the search term of “opinion((TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1 (TEST or
INQUIRY))” for these searches.
71 Universal Form Clamp Co. v. Taxis, 267 F. 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1920) (“To compare appellant’s
present with its former device to determine equivalency would be to substitute for the elements of the
claim as written the mechanical equivalents of appellant’s first structure. It would be giving patentee a
double or two-step test for determining equivalency.”). Specifically, the dates used were January 1, 1875
and December 31, 1949. The first date was chosen because this is the first case that is mentioned in the
database. Relaxing the search term to “opinion((TWO or THREE) /2 (STEP or PRONG!) /2 (TEST or
INQUIRY))” adds a second case. Adam v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd., 16 Conn. Supp. 281, 283 (Super.
Ct. 1949) (“Three steps of inquiry are indicated: (1) What were the charges? (2) What act does the statute
provide for revocation? (3) On the findings made upon the evidence, are the conclusions justified in the
light of the statute?”). Including the possibility of four-step tests using the search string “opinion((TWO
or THREE or FOUR) /2 (STEP or PRONG!) /2 (TEST or INQUIRY))” does not further alter the results.
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cases by examining three different time periods to track the evolution of this
trend over time.
Further, one point of this Section is to observe that the language of these
tests did not exist in the way it does now, despite the fact that similar tests
may have existed in the past. Moreover, examination of individual cases
reveals that the tests that did exist related more to instances of multiprong
offenses rather than replacements for multifactor balancing tests. The trend
observed using this method is suggestive of a true shift in the underlying
legal culture rather than merely a shift in terminology.
1. 1875 to 1950
Just one federal or state case employs the language of stepification in
this time period. But, while this case actually uses the terms in question, it
does not use them to articulate a doctrinal test. In Universal Form Clamp Co.
v. Taxis, the Seventh Circuit addressed a patent infringement claim.72 While
the opinion uses the phrase “two-step test,” the reference is not to an existing
doctrinal test but rather to a two-step test proposed by the appellees, which
the court rejects. 73 A look at the history of this period more generally,
however, reveals that multistep frameworks did exist, though they were often
not couched in this language.
For example, running the original search but including summaries 74
highlights a second federal case during this time period. In Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. France, the Supreme Court considered a claim to recover
on a life insurance policy.75 The Court noted that the jury had to answer two
questions to evaluate the case: “first, [w]as the representation made? second,
[w]as it false?”76 This latter case illustrates the point made above: the law has
never been entirely without steps. But their prevalence has grown and the
language used to describe these doctrines has shifted—perhaps as the formal
notion of a multistep test took form.
My claim here is not that there were no multiprong tests during this time
period—there were—but rather that courts were seemingly not creating new
tests nor speaking in the language of multistep tests.77 Moreover, the data in

72

267 F. at 580.
Id. (rejecting appellee’s argument that because appellant’s first device was admitted to be an
infringement and because the “second structure is the mechanical equivalent of the first, infringement by
appellant’s second structure is shown” as an impermissible “two-step test for determining equivalency”).
74 This means that the term searched was: “(TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1 (TEST or
INQUIRY).” This allows the search to include results from the summary portion of the Lexis entry that do
not appear in the opinion.
75 91 U.S. 510, 510 (1876).
76 Id. at 516.
77 See supra Section I.B.
73
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the Appendix suggest that modern multistep tests are not simply restatements
of older tests reexpressed in new language. Rather, Chevron potentially
adopted the current two-step language because it was born in a fertile
moment for that sort of rhetoric. Further, around this time, more and more
areas that did not naturally break into several component parts were
nevertheless converted into multistep tests.78
2. 1960 to 1970
Moving forward to the 1960s reveals a small uptick in cases and a
general trend towards modern stepification. While the number of reported
cases remains small79—thirty-three federal80 and eighteen state81—many of
these cases apply multistep tests to resolve more complicated issues than
those presented in cases from earlier times. We see here an indication of the
development of stepification, as well as evidence that its emergence as a
widespread trend postdates this period.
The cases over this period evince the development of multistep tests to
evaluate certain normative questions. For example, in United States ex rel.
Thurmond v. Mancusi, the district court, without citation, engaged in a “two
step inquiry” to determine whether a guilty plea was voluntary.82 Similarly,
in King v. Gardner, the Fifth Circuit drew on Fourth Circuit law that had
developed a two-step test to determine whether a disability existed.83
During this time, district courts also described doctrine derived from
other opinions in the language of steps. For example, in Wirtz v. Monarch
Patrol & Detective Service, Inc., the district court applied a two-step test it
derived from Supreme Court precedent to determine whether a given activity
or service was interstate commerce.84 The court acknowledged that it was
drawing its test from earlier cases but chose to summarize the doctrine in the
78

See infra Part III (discussing examples).
There are three unreported federal cases and zero unreported state cases.
80 But note that six of these federal cases refer to multistep tests in the context of medical tests as
opposed to doctrinal tests. See Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965); McGiven v. United
States, 183 Ct. Cl. 920, 928 (1968); Morgan v. Gardner, 254 F. Supp. 977, 980 (N.D. Okla. 1966); Riddle
v. Celebrezze, 235 F. Supp. 657, 660 (W.D.S.C. 1964); McCord v. Celebrezze, 221 F. Supp. 206, 209
(W.D.S.C. 1963); Ferrell v. Gardner, 260 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
81 The same search term was used on Lexis for this result. Specifically, the term searched was
“opinion((TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1 (TEST or INQUIRY)).” The dates in question were January
1, 1960 to December 31, 1969.
82 275 F. Supp. 508, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
83 391 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1967) (“It is clear from the statutory language that the determination
of disability involves a two-step inquiry.” (citing Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 192, 194 (4th Cir.
1965))); see also Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 545 (4th Cir. 1964) (articulating first the test from
Cyrus by noting that “[t]here really are two steps to a finding of disability”).
84 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7910, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1967) (citing Durkin v. Joyce Agency,
Inc., 110 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1953), aff’d, 348 U.S. 945 (1955)).
79
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language of steps, arguing that these previous cases “essentially applied [a]
two step test.”85
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these scattered cases, but
two general lessons stand out. First, there was an increased use of the
language of multistep tests to describe what the courts in question were
doing. The main judicial test being applied by the federal courts seems to be
the Aguilar two-step test to evaluate the reliability of search warrants based
on anonymous information.86 Other tests, however, were also being used.87
Second, the number of cases that used this language was still remarkably
small. While the evidence indicates that multistep tests were in use at the
time in multiple areas of the law, 88 the fact that there are relatively few
examples of these cases suggests that the number of multistep tests being
applied at the appellate level was still fairly small. Indeed, relaxing the search
term to look for only examples of the use of phrases like “two step” and
“three prong” produces only 699 results over the same time period.89 This
further evidences that judges at this time were thinking in the language of
steps in general, though the terminology was still emerging during this time.
3. 2000 to 2010
Thirty years later, the trend has accelerated. 90 The original search
produces 14,538 cases using the language of stepification, 4,093 of which
are published. Moreover, these cases cover a broad range of doctrinal areas
from the more familiar, such as qualified immunity,91 to the less well known,
such as equal educational opportunity.92

85

Id.
For examples of federal courts utilizing the Aguilar two-step test, see Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969), and McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1969).
87 See, e.g., D/S A/S Flint v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 228 F. Supp. 384, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (applying
a two-step test to resolve a service of process issue in admiralty cases).
88 See, e.g., Printing Plate Supply Co. v. Crescent Engraving Co., 246 F. Supp. 654, 660–61 (W.D.
Mich. 1965) (applying a “three-step test of patentability”).
89 Specifically, this result was obtained looking over the January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1969
period using the search term “opinion((TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!)).”
This modification was chosen to capture instances where the courts expressed a decision as a twostep process without categorizing it as a two-step doctrinal test. Additionally, a look at the search results
indicates that the 699 number may be high, as many results refer to steps in reference to the facts of the
case as opposed to the doctrine being applied.
90 Of course, one could attempt to tell the story of every intervening decade as well. My point of
skipping ahead is to just illustrate the current status quo as stepification has taken hold.
91 For an example of a lower court considering the qualified immunity defense during this time
period, see Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 584 F. Supp. 2d 974, 988–99 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 572 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Castaneda v.
Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981)) (articulating a three-prong test for compliance with 20 U.S.C.
§ 1703(f)), rev’d, 601 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2010).
86

401

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Indeed, a look at the six Supreme Court cases93 that explicitly employ
the language of step tests during this period illustrates these tests’ broad
application, spanning a variety of different doctrinal areas ranging from
reservation of land94 to obscenity.95 Relaxing the search term to include any
cases in which the Court mentions steps at all reveals additional cases in
which the Court is working within a stepified framework or discussing an
existing doctrinal test.96 Though this sample undoubtedly fails to capture the
full extent to which the Court is engaging in stepwise reasoning, it points to
the expansion of this language and to the fact that the growth in multistep
cases was not limited to a few famous examples.
This historical evolution has two general implications. First, there is a
change in the usage of the language of steps. If there is one thing that this
method can establish, it is that courts and judges have taken to using the
language of steps more broadly. This trend has occurred not only in the
famous areas discussed above, but also in a variety of other doctrinal areas.97
Second, and more tentatively, the data suggest that there was an
increase in the number of step tests being used doctrinally. While the
information from earlier eras suggests that step tests have always been a legal
reality, the dramatic increase in the language of multiprong tests suggests a
broader trend. The evidence grows stronger still when coupled with the
qualitative examples discussed earlier of courts and scholars converting
areas of law into these new stepwise regimes over time.
*

*

*

As noted repeatedly throughout this Section, it is difficult to make a
definitive claim about exactly what happened to cause a shift to occur
suddenly in the 1970s and ’80s. There were relatively few cases using the
language of stepification before 1970. The number then continued to grow
slowly during the ’70s before a period of steady growth began in the ’80s

93 Relaxing the search term to “opinion((TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!))” alters this number to
forty-six cases at the Supreme Court level.
94 Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 100 (2005); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 273–74
(2001).
95 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 574–79 (2002) (applying the three-prong Miller test). The other
cases also concern a variety of issues. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (considering
qualified immunity defense); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (applying Batson three-step
framework).
96 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005)
(discussing the Chevron framework); Barhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24–25 (2003) (applying the Social
Security Administration’s five-step evaluation to determine disability).
97 See infra Part III.
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that has not yet abated. The same trend, albeit more drastic in terms of the
absolute number of cases, can be seen in unpublished opinions. Both trends
are illustrated in Figures 1A and 1B, respectively.
FIGURE 1A: REPORTED FEDERAL CASES USING THE LANGUAGE OF STEP TESTS98
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FIGURE 1B: UNREPORTED FEDERAL CASES USING THE LANGUAGE OF STEP TESTS
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98 Cases were looked at in five-year increments. The search term used was “opinion((TWO or THREE)
/1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1 (TEST or INQUIRY)).” A similar trend can be observed in the relevant state cases.
Initially, more reported cases used the language of stepification, but the number of unreported cases grew
more quickly than reported cases. From 2005 to 2009 there were approximately 2,700 cases of each type,
but from 2010 to 2014 there were over 4,000 unreported cases and fewer than 3,000 reported cases.
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The trend is also robust to controlling for the total number of reported
and unreported cases. The proportions of reported and unreported federal
cases using the language of steps are depicted in Figure 2:
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL CASES USING THE LANGUAGE OF STEP TESTS99
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Reported Opinions

Unreported Opinions

Analysis of the cases seems to preclude an argument that one or two
doctrinal areas drove all of this growth. And indeed, the random sample
included in the Appendix of 100 cases from between 2010 and 2014
reinforces this conclusion, with only thirteen qualified immunity cases and
three Chevron cases. At some point, judges started to turn to the language of
steps to express their ideas. In some cases, this language merely codified the
previous status quo, but in others it transformed the doctrine into its modern
form, replacing more amorphous processes with more regimented ones.
Exploring the reasons for this shift is the project of the next Section.
B. Stepification as an Intellectual Trend
The evidence of stepification suggests a trend in American
jurisprudence that has previously gone unnoticed. While from our modern
vantage point, steps may seem a mundane feature of legal decision-making,
the extent of their use is a novel phenomenon and the language of multistep
tests is the result of an intellectual shift among judges.
The examination of the cases indicates, however, that no “smoking
gun” explanation for the growth of stepification suggests itself. For example,
99 Again, the total number of reported cases was determined by searching “opinion(atleast4(THE)).”
See supra note 63 (describing the reasoning for this search).
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rather than a single case driving the trend, the rise of steps occurs across
different areas seemingly at once.
Despite this, we can speculate about the causes of this shift. The
remainder of this Section proceeds by first offering an internal hypothesis
for the trend, one driven by lawyers and judges. It then offers a second, more
external perspective of stepification as part of a broader movement among
American elites towards decision theory as an approach to managing
complexity.
1. Internal Trends
One story that could be told is that the trend towards multistep tests is
a part of the broader movement in U.S. law towards proceduralization and
away from balancing. It was part of a move to focus on procedure and
occurred contemporaneously with the rise of textualist and originalist
methodologies that claimed, in part, to be justified by their rule-like nature
as opposed to more subjective inquiries.100 Professor Kaplow, for example,
notes that there has long been a “queasiness” about balancing and a desire to
disguise its operation using structure.101 And indeed, in his dissent in June
Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, Justice Neil Gorsuch argued explicitly that
interest-balancing was inappropriate for courts, whose work should be
restricted to structured inquiries that avoid evaluation of “competing social
interests.”102
Justice Gorsuch’s position fits well within the post-New Deal history of
the law. Professor Thomas Grey has written that after the New Deal there
was a doctrinal turn towards procedure as opposed to substantive law.103
While this is historically earlier than stepification, there is further evidence
to suggest that the development of the legal process school reoriented the
law towards procedure. 104 The map is not perfect, as stepification is not
100

See, e.g., AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
1–3 (2015) (dating the origins of the conservative legal
movement to the start of the Reagan Administration in 1980); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSERVATIVES AND THE
CONSTITUTION, at viii (2019) (arguing that the roots of the conservative legal movement grew out of
Richard Nixon’s victory in 1968 and triumphed with the election of Ronald Reagan).
101 Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules, supra note 22, at 1047–48.
102 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2179 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
103 See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 502 (1996)
(reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)) (“Three elements defined
the Process approach: focus on the rule of law as a value essential to the preservation of liberal democracy;
support for the New Deal and the modern administrative and welfare state; and doctrinal emphasis
jurisdiction and procedure as against substantive law.”).
104 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 722–23 (1991) (“The normativity of law rests in its
process, and not in its substance. As we shall now see, however, legal process’ proceduralism was itself
AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION
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necessarily proceduralization, but the analogy is suggestive. Stepification
proceduralizes a particular doctrinal issue of the law. 105 In particular, the
proceduralization of stepification adds rigidity to the process by which a
decision is reached, allowing the result of the case to be articulated as a set
of answers to disjoint questions.
To put the point more sharply, stepification can be seen as formalism
without ideal forms. It works to formalize jurisprudence without the need for
a Langdellian view that a number of underlying principles animate the law.
Professor Langdell argued that lawyers could use scientific methods to
derive correct legal judgments from a few basic principles and concepts.106
This feature of stepification is demonstrated by the large number of areas of
law to which it has been applied without any apparent thought given to the
underlying topic.107
It is then notable that stepification occurred after a period in which there
was a move towards balancing and away from bright-line rules. As Professor
John Langbein and his coauthors have highlighted, the original Restatements
appeared between 1932 and 1944 and were immediately critiqued by the
realists as insufficiently nuanced and overly simplistic.108 This dynamic may
have been reflective of the general trend of the codification movement:
Professor Grant Gilmore makes what is perhaps a parallel critique of
Professor Langdell’s early casebooks by observing that Professor Langdell
seemingly pruned out nonconforming cases in his mission to present the
evolution of the law towards “the ideal of the one true rule of law.”109 In
response to this challenge, Professor Langbein observes that there was a
movement within the Second Restatements towards a balancing approach
that would capture the nuance that the realists charged was lacking.110 The
period before stepification was therefore marked by the rise of balancing to
express the nuance the realists perceived was missing from the formalist
picture of the law.

subject to different ideological interpretations, and almost immediately in history dissolved into
competing normative visions.”).
105 See infra Part III.
106 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983) (“The heart of the theory
was the view that law is a science. Langdell believed that through scientific methods lawyers could derive
correct legal judgments from a few fundamental principles and concepts, which it was the task of the
scholar-scientist like himself to discover.”).
107 See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
108 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 853–54 (2009). I am indebted to
Michael Masciandaro for directing me towards this point.
109 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42–43 (2d ed. 2014).
110 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at 853–54.
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But the embrace of balancing as a way to capture and express
complexity did not last. In particular, the other historical event lurking in the
background is the broader legacy of the Warren Court. This is not to say that
stepification is a response to a particular Warren Court decision or set of
decisions. Rather, another suggestive connection is that the worry about
judicial discretion was transformed into a move to proceduralize the law. Of
course, as I argue below, this transformation was not an escape from
substantive law. Rather, as Professor Richard Re points out, steps themselves
have normative valence even if equivalent logical formulations with greater
or fewer steps exist.111 The rhetoric of stepification, however, is a refuge from
certain accusations of discretion.112 Stepification offers, at the very least, the
appearance of order. This is not to say that it does not have benefits, but its
power is tangled up in its ability to give the work of judges a certain
appearance of neutrality. Moreover, it can provide appellate courts with the
ability to control lower court discretion via the creation of more rule-like
structures to guide decision-making.113
Stepification, then, arose at a time when at least some observers were
concerned about judicial discretion. Indeed, several parallel shifts explicitly
in response to the Warren Court similarly looked to limit the discretion of
judges. These shifts focused the inquiry in cases on single questions rather
than on more complicated multifactor approaches. For example, the
textualist movement was driven, in part, by an effort to simplify the process
of interpretation and to make it more predictable. 114 While textualism has
certainly been defended on other grounds,115 its appeal to a single question—
what do the words mean—has given it a rhetorical advantage over

111

See Re, supra note 59, at 608.
See Pozen & Samaha, supra note 27, at 741–68 (arguing that constitutional lawyers must exclude
certain modes of reasoning to stabilize the distinction between law and politics).
113 See infra Section IV.B.
114
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–47 (1983)
(defending a textualist approach in part based on the fact that it “gives the legislature a low-cost method
to signal its favored judicial approach to public interest legislation” and “recognizes that courts cannot
reconstruct an original meaning because there is none to find”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 340–41 (1990) (“By
emphasizing the statutory words chosen by the legislature, rather than (what seem to be) more abstract
and judicially malleable interpretive sources, textualism also appeals to the values of legislative
supremacy and judicial restraint.”).
115 See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 323–25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that democracy requires judges to rely on the text of the statute);
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73 (2006) (“[T]he
‘new textualism’ challenged the prevailing judicial orthodoxy by arguing that the Constitution, properly
understood, requires judges to treat the clear import of an enacted text as conclusive . . . .”).
112
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competitors that focus on more ambiguous inquiries. 116 Professor Caleb
Nelson has observed as much, noting that textualists have an affinity for rulelike methods of interpretation over standards.117 What the text means is not
as sharp and crisp as the typical legal bright line (though it may be an
improvement); the issue is whether something is rule-like in nature.
Textualism, especially its strictest version, which rejects all other sources,
offers just such a rule-like interpretive process.118 Textualism presents itself
as a highly proceduralized project that aspires to neutrality and objectivity.
Its tools, including a list of Latin canons, give the appearance of a largely
mechanical process of interpretation, taking the judge out of the equation.
Similarly, originalism shares textualism’s goal of making interpretation
more predictable and less personal.119 Indeed, originalism itself is a sort of
stepified constitutional inquiry, though it is often not expressed this way and
various originalist theories might operate differently. It requires the
interpreter to look first to the text of the Constitution and its original meaning
and then, if the text is unclear, to structure and history for insight.120 If these
sources are ambiguous, then other sources may come into play.
Originalism can perhaps be seen as a stepification of Professor Phillip
Bobbitt’s famous six modalities of constitutional interpretation.121 First, at
the “interpretation” stage, text, history, and structure can be used to discover
the linguistic meaning of the provisions of the Constitution. 122 Second,
construction may be required to give legal effect to the linguistic meaning,

116 See Easterbrook, supra note 114, at 533 (“The construction of an ambiguous document is a work
of judicial creation or re-creation. Using the available hints and tools—the words and structure of the
statute, the subject matter and general policy of the enactment, the legislative history, the lobbying
positions of interest groups, and the temper of the times—judges try to determine how the Congress that
enacted the statute either actually resolved or would have resolved a particular issue if it had faced and
settled it explicitly at the time.”).
117 Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 350 (2005).
118 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 114, at 340–41 (describing the two strains of textualism).
119 See, e.g., Mary Wood, Scalia Defends Originalism as Best Methodology for Judging Law, UNIV.
OF VA. SCH. OF L. (Apr. 20, 2010), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2010_spr/scalia.htm [https://
perma.cc/34RL-JH3K] (reporting on a speech by the late Justice in which he argued that originalism
properly restricted the discretion of judges).
120 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and
Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 391 (2003) (“Under this approach, one first examines the
meaning of the Constitution from an eighteenth-century perspective to determine whether it
unambiguously resolves the question. If the language is unclear, one then looks to structure, purpose, and
history to resolve that ambiguity.”).
121 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 123–24 (1982)
(listing the traditional modalities as (1) historical, (2) textual, (3) structural, (4) prudential, and
(5) doctrinal and arguing that a sixth, ethical modality, exists).
122 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95,
101–02 (2010).
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requiring a normative theory which may include other modalities. 123 Of
course, this process may result in conflict between results reached at the
interpretation stage and those reached by reasoning via precedent (for
example, where an important, related precedent is nonoriginalist), but it is
precisely this issue that has attracted controversy as originalists debate how
to fit nonoriginalist precedent into their system.124 The rise of originalism is
therefore further evidence of an intellectual trend among lawyers during the
1980s and ’90s to make the law more rule-like and less subjective.
Regardless of the other ideological motives of certain proponents,
originalism and textualism strike a similar, and certainly attractive, chord to
multistep tests.125 They add structure to inquiries that may seem unstructured
to others, potentially adding to the predictability or at least the expressive
rule-of-law values of the law.126 Accordingly, the fact that stepification also
emerged during this time suggests a connection between these trends in
lawyerly thinking.
To restate the hypothesis, stepification emerged at this time to make the
law more rule-like where a single rule would not do. That is, where the law
could not be reduced to a single bright-line rule, it was rendered more
procedural by instead replacing balancing tests with a series of multiple
single inquiries. Stepification is, therefore, an effort to extend the reach of
these new formalisms to more areas of the law. Indeed, in City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, we see Justice Sandra Day O’Connor critiquing the majority for
balancing rather than applying the tiers of scrutiny on the ground that the
multistep tiers are themselves rules rather than “subjective balancing

123 See id. at 104–07. This would include some combination of the doctrinal, prudential, and ethical
modalities. See id.
124 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 823–29 (2009) (developing a theory of how following precedent is consistent
with originalism); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach,
33 CONST. COMMENT. 451, 456–70 (2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A
THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017)) (summarizing the problem of precedent for originalists and the debate
on the topic and offering thoughts on how to resolve the debate).
125 Textualism also arguably comes, in part, from the same law and economics sources I suggest
were part of the drivers of stepification in general later. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 114, at 340 (“The
legal realists and legal process thinkers discredited intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory
interpretation; in its place they suggested purposivism. That theory has in turn been extensively criticized,
especially by scholars influenced by the law and economics movement.”); see infra Section II.B.2.
126 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 114, at 340 (“As suggested above, textualism appeals to the ruleof-law value that citizens ought to be able to read the statute books and know their rights and duties. By
emphasizing the statutory words chosen by the legislature, rather than (what seem to be) more abstract
and judicially malleable interpretive sources, textualism also appeals to the values of legislative
supremacy and judicial restraint.”).
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tests.” 127 This theory has further resonance with Justice Antonin Scalia’s
famous call for appellate courts to decide cases with rules rather than
standards as crisp decision procedures were necessary to ensure uniformity
in lower courts.128 It is perhaps the case, then, that the language of multistep
tests also reflects a shift to appellate courts seeing their role as more focused
on formulating rules of decision rather than resolving individual disputes.129
And where a bright-line rule would not do, stepification was the next best
thing. For example, it may have been impossible to formulate a bright-line
rule to govern deference to agency statutory interpretation, but at least the
two-step Chevron formulation could add some rigidity to the inquiry.
Indeed, if the internal story is to be believed (and not cynically
attributed to brute political considerations), perhaps the best parallel is to the
story that Professor Gilmore tells about the move towards formalism during
the height of tensions over slavery. As Professor Gilmore notes, a judge
confronted with discomfort about the role she is charged to fill can either
resign or choose to enforce the law in a way that limits the personal
connection of the judge to the results she is articulating.130 Of course, a retreat
from the notion that judging is political is importantly different from the
choice between resignation and enforcing law that one thinks is odious and
unjust. While a principled judge may not resign in response to a belief that
her job is becoming politicized, she may retreat to formalism as a refuge
from the challenge that judging is personal, just as earlier judges did when
charged with enforcing a regime that they felt was unjust.
Consequently, one ought not overread the degree to which formalism
and sharp rules are associated with judicial neutrality. While the realist
movement challenged the nature of judging, it is not obvious that a prestepified world was one in which judges were broadly perceived to be
lawless, though it may look that way from certain current viewpoints. 131
While it is difficult to unmoor ourselves from the modern day, it is not clear
127 512 U.S. 43, 59–60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that despite the critiques of this
rule-like approach, “it has substantial merit as well. It is a rule, in an area where fairly precise rules are
better than more discretionary and more subjective balancing tests”). I am indebted to Professor Robert
Post for suggesting this example.
128 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–79 (1989).
129 I am indebted to Professor Michael Coenen for suggesting this connection.
130 See GILMORE, supra note 109, at 33–34.
131 Indeed, lawyers had long tried to make law scientific before they discover the language of steps.
See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1995) (“Langdell not only established
the use of the case method as a pedagogical device, but also promoted the idea that the case method is
necessary to the teaching of law as a science. It is the idea that law is a science, and the promotion of this
idea by the use of the case method, which constitutes his sole yet fundamental contribution to American
legal education.”); GILMORE, supra note 109, at 38–39 (observing how literally Langdell took this notion
of law as a science).
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that the development of stepification was a necessary development for the
law to reform itself into a systematic endeavor. Indeed, Professor Gilmore
documented the earlier movement in the United States towards formalism in
light of the issues presented to judges in the shadow of slavery.132 But this
earlier move, as observed above, was free of the stepification observed
recently in American law.133 The story thus cannot be one of a mere move
towards formalism and away from the notion that judges imbued decisions
with their personal, moral judgments.
Moreover, even to the extent that the internal story is correct, these
conclusions are speculative and unfalsifiable. The causality story told here is
not provable and, unlike arguments about the Supreme Court, cannot be
verified with reference to the Justices’ papers.134 The connections suggest,
however, that stepification resonates with broader trends in the legal
community.
There is one further problem with this story. The problem with a simple
story of lawyers moving to make the law more structured is that law has long
been concerned with clarity and the development of workable rules. 135
Whether or not the language of steps improves clarity, an explanation that
stands only on a story of clarity and discretion cannot be enough. There has
long been a trend towards trying to make law more “scientific.” This
formalist move easily predates the move towards steps.136 An internal story
about a trend towards more rule-like law cannot tell us why the language of
steps was chosen to fulfill this function. This answer must lie elsewhere.
2. The External Story
This Section makes the claim that stepification was not an isolated
process within legal jurisprudence but one that is more fruitfully situated
within a broader trend of proceduralization in the American elite. In
particular, the rise of stepification is suggestively contemporaneous with the
rise of decision-tree analysis within the field of management. The natural
meeting place for these external trends and legal elites was the law and
economics movement, which introduced a new attempt to render the law
132 GILMORE, supra note 109, at 32–35 (attributing the move towards formalism as part of the general
desire of certain judges to distance themselves from the decisions they were required to issue in upholding
the pro-slavery regime).
133 See supra Section II.A.
134 See, e.g., Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 2, 32–35 (2018) (reviewing the
papers of the Justices to argue that class was an underappreciated aspect of their decision-making with
respect to certain rights decisions).
135 Cf. GILMORE, supra note 109, at 23–32 (describing the movement in the early nineteenth century
to codify the law in the name of uniformity).
136 DUXBURY, supra note 131, at 24–25 (tracing the high-water mark of Langellian formalism to the
Restatement movement in the early twentieth century).
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scientific via the science of economics and its tools for deciding difficult
normative issues.137
Step tests are essentially decision-tree methods for resolving legal
questions. Because they break up issues into component parts that can be
resolved independently, these tests can be formulated and expressed as the
sort of multipart decisions embodied in decision-tree analyses.138
While decision-tree analysis may seem rather natural and therefore
mundane today, it is in fact historically recent. In 1964, an article in the
Harvard Business Review introduced the decision tree as a novel solution
technique for management problems.139 The article presents the decision tree
as something of a managerial silver bullet, reducing complexity to a series
of manageable individual decisions. 140 At once, the “choices, risks,
objectives, monetary gains, and information needs involved in an investment
problem” could be clarified and organized in a rigorous way.141 The author
was careful to acknowledge that the decision tree could not eliminate entirely
the need for judgment, but argued that by structuring the problem, the
method could improve the quality of investments.142
As Leigh Buchanan and Andrew O’Connell note, the term decisionmaking in business was borrowed from the field of public administration in
the middle of the twentieth century. 143 Its introduction was not merely a
stylistic change. Rather, Buchanan and O’Connell argue that these more
formal methods altered management itself, introducing crispness and
decisiveness into planning.144
These methods were not without their critics. As quantitative methods
infiltrated business school curricula, commentators charged that they had

137

See infra notes 157–162 and accompanying text.
See Re, supra note 59, at 611 fig.1 (expressing Chevron in a decision-tree format).
139 See John F. Magee, Decision Trees for Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1964, at 126,
127 (“In this article I shall present one recently developed concept called the ‘decision tree,’ which has
tremendous potential as a decision-making tool. The decision tree can clarify for management, as can no
other analytical tool that I know of, the choices, risks, objectives, monetary gains, and information needs
involved in an investment problem. We shall be hearing a great deal about decision trees in the years
ahead. Although a novelty to most businessmen today, they will surely be in common management
parlance before many more years have passed.”).
140 See id. at 127–28.
141 Id. at 127.
142 See id. at 135.
143 Leigh Buchanan & Andrew O’Connell, A Brief History of Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan. 2006, at 32, 33.
144 Id.
138
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displaced the “practice” of business.145 This critique interestingly parallels
the argument against certain manifestations of formalism. Critics of the new
scientific methods argued that they were too abstract, prizing a level of
“analytic detachment and methodological elegance over insight based on
experience.”146
The debate over scientific management then interestingly parallels legal
debates over more rigid decision-making methods. Proponents of rigidity
argue that it disciplines decisions. 147 But critics argue it strips out the
valuable role of individual judgment.148 Despite these concerns, however, it
seems that for now the tools of technical management are mostly here to
stay.149
The interest in using decision theory to improve judgment was not
limited to business. For example, in 1951 Professor John Rawls published a
paper aiming to develop a seven-step decision theory for ethical
judgments.150 Professor Rawls attempted this work because, in his words:
[T]he objectivity or the subjectivity of moral knowledge turns, not on the
question whether ideal value entities exist or whether moral judgments are
caused by emotions or whether there is a variety of moral codes the world over,
but simply on the question: does there exist a reasonable method for validating
and invalidating given or proposed moral rules and those decisions made on the
basis of them?151

For morality to be objective in Professor Rawls’s telling, it must be so in the
sense that science is objective, with rules to decide between true and false
claims.152
145 Samuel Paul, Management Education: Emerging Trends, VIKALPA, Oct.–Dec. 1992, at 11, 14
(“By the 1980s, the pendulum had swung the other way and some schools which were using sophisticated
quantitative techniques were being attacked for putting too much emphasis on theoretical knowledge
about business and for seriously neglecting the ‘practice’ of business.”); see David J. Teece & Sidney G.
Winter, The Limits of Neoclassical Theory in Management Education, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 116, 116
(1984) (discussing this critique).
146 Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. BUS.
REV., July–Aug. 1980, at 67, 70.
147 See, e.g., Magee, supra note 139, at 135 (“Using the decision tree, management can consider
various courses of action with greater ease and clarity. The interactions between present decision
alternatives, uncertain events, and future choices and their results become more visible.”).
148 See, e.g., Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 146, at 70; Paul, supra note 145, at 14.
149 See, e.g., Jay Peters, Whole Foods Is Reportedly Using a Heat Map to Track Stores at Risk of
Unionization, VERGE (Apr. 20, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/20/21228324/
amazon-whole-foods-unionization-heat-map-union [https://perma.cc/W78Q-7QDA] (reporting on how
Whole Foods is using a heat map, which uses more than two dozen different metrics, to track stores at
risk of unionization).
150 John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177, 191–93 (1951).
151 Id. at 177.
152 Id.
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At the same time, there was a parallel move in poetry criticism towards
a new formalism and away from more open forms. 153 Writing in 1987,
Professor Dana Gioia observed that in the 1960s it “was a truth universally
acknowledged that a young poet in possession of a good ear would want to
write free verse.”154 The revival of form at the tail end of the ’70s came after
“knowing critics had declared rhyme and meter permanently defunct.”155 Of
course, in the case of poetry, this move was in part a return to traditional
approaches and not the novel innovation I am arguing stepification
represented. But there is an important similarity in the appreciation of more
closed and regimented forms, one suggestive of the intellectual currents of
the time.156
Relevant as well is the movement towards law and economics with its
focus on deriving objective standards for law. 157 Perhaps the most
appropriate summation of the goals of that movement was articulated by
then-Professor Richard Posner in the inaugural issue of the Journal of Legal
Studies:
The aim of the Journal is to encourage the application of scientific methods to
the study of the legal system. As biology is to living organisms, astronomy to
the stars, or economics to the price system, so should legal studies be to the
legal system: an endeavor to make precise, objective, and systematic
observations of how the legal system operates in fact and to discover and
explain the recurrent patterns in the observations—the “laws” of the system.158

In the vision of law and economics, the law was to return to a scientific state,
one that was precise and objective.159
Indeed, the first issue of the Journal specifically referenced the need for
a theory of legal decision-making as one of the core themes of its mission.160
Professor Posner wrote that “[m]any of the practices and institutions by

153

I am indebted to Nicholas Parrillo for pointing out the concurrent rise of formalism in literature
and literary theory.
154 Dana Gioia, Notes on the New Formalism, 40 HUDSON REV. 395, 395 (1987).
155 Id.
156 Cf. Alan Shapiro, The New Formalism, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 200, 211–12 (1987) (discussing the
view that formalism in poetry was inherently conservative while open forms were viewed as more “open,
organic, exploratory, [and] natural”).
157 See Philip Bobbitt, The Age of Consent, in GILMORE, supra note 109, at 100, 112–13.
158 Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies—an Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
437, 437 (1972).
159 It was out of this general trend that a game theoretic view of the law could even emerge. See
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1–2
(1994) (arguing that “a rigorous focus on strategic behavior” can advance an understanding of the law in
contexts ranging from simple tort dilemmas to complex antitrust suits).
160 Posner, supra note 158, at 439.
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which legal rules are formulated and applied are poorly understood,” which
the articles in the first volume of the new Journal aimed to remedy.161 While
none of these articles addressed the form of legal tests head on, Professor
Posner declared the study of legal rules and tests as one of the three missions
of his initial volume.162
Seen against this backdrop, the history of stepification seems less
surprising and more of an inevitable evolution. Stepwise tests carry with
them an air of formulaic decision-making, the precise element that the law
and economics movement was looking for. Moreover, the addition of steps
and the language of decision theory to law was in line with a broader elite
movement towards structure and away from amorphous judgment. 163 The
formalization of judgment into mathematical rules occurred in multiple areas
at similar times, impacting each.
While the above examples are suggestive of the underlying drivers of
stepification, they cannot be dispositive. It is impossible to identify precisely
why judges and lawyers chose to take up the language of decision trees and
multistep inquiries to guide their work. The most that can be said is that the
tool they turned to was one that had currency in other areas as a tool to
improve judgment by adding procedural structure.
Thus, while elements of the external story for the rise of stepification
seem somewhat convincing,164 that story is critically incomplete. This Article
is not about the effort to make the law more neutral or about that project’s
success or failure. Rather, what is important is the form that effort took. In
adopting stepification, lawyers drew on a broader movement among elites of
the time to rationalize decision-making more generally and to reduce the
ambiguity of decisions to workable decision procedures. The question then
becomes the implication of this historical turn.

161

Id. at 439–40.
Id. (“A third important theme of this volume is the quest for a theory of legal decision-making.
Many of the practices and institutions by which legal rules are formulated and applied are poorly
understood—the jury, the rhetoric of the appellate opinion, the formalities of the adversary process, are
some important examples. A number of articles in volume one explore perplexing features of the legal
decisional process.”).
163 Though, perhaps ironically, the business community eventually experienced a shift back towards
the cult of the “gut.” See Buchanan & O’Connell, supra note 143, at 40 (“That semantic shift—from
human’s stomach to lion’s heart—helps explain the current fascination with gut decision making. From
our admiration for entrepreneurs and firefighters, to the popularity of books by Malcolm Gladwell and
Gary Klein, to the outcomes of the last two U.S. presidential elections, instinct appears ascendant.
Pragmatists act on evidence. Heroes act on guts.”). Still, the practice of modern management shows that
the idea of more precise and scientific decision-making influences current practices yet.
164 And certainly there was a real drive by certain actors to make the law more neutral by making it
more scientific. Bobbitt, supra note 157, at 110–13 (describing the economic turn as an effort to remove
politics from law).
162
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Stepification as a process is not an isolated feature of individual areas
of the law. Rather, it is ubiquitous across different areas of the law. Where
chaos appears within the law, stepification serves to organize it. This
organization is sometimes illusory, however, and chaos eventually returns as
pressure is put upon various doctrinal frameworks. Step tests can break down
as their normative tensions expose certain weaknesses in their ability to
capture what is important about the underlying issue in question. To see this,
the next Part of this Article works through some concrete examples of the
phenomenon.
III. EXAMPLES OF STEPIFICATION (AND ITS DRAWBACKS)
While the above overview of stepification demonstrates its increasing
role in the law, its normative implications are difficult to observe without
concrete examples. As such, this Part discusses four brief case studies of the
process in action—two in the past and two more recent examples—to
illustrate the claim that stepification has universal qualities and significance
across areas of the law.
The first two examples are historical regimes: Chevron and Lemon. In
both cases, the Supreme Court articulated what seemed to be a universal
framework for the issue at hand. And in both cases, the structure has
persisted despite challenges to its legitimacy.
The final two examples are cases in which the Court has chosen not to
adopt a multistep framework. I first include the example of criminal
procedure because it is in these cases that the Court has most openly grappled
with the implications of adopting multistep tests. Additionally, in partisan
gerrymandering cases, the majority declined to adopt a multistep framework
despite the argument by the dissenters that a multistep approach was both
workable and familiar to courts.
The purpose of these examples is to show stepification is transdoctrinal
and transhistorical. Of course, other options could have been chosen, such as
the qualified immunity two-step test, but these examples illustrate important
elements of what I argue is a general phenomenon.
A. Chevron
The most famous example of stepification is the transition from the
deference regime announced in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., in which deference
was based on the agency’s “power to persuade,”165 to the two-step test of
165
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Chevron.166 Skidmore provided a general set of factors that a court would
consider, stating that deference would depend on “the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”167 In contrast, the Chevron doctrine
asks (1) whether the statutory term is ambiguous and then (2) whether the
agency’s interpretation of the ambiguity is reasonable. 168 While dispute
exists about whether Chevron actually matters at the Supreme Court level, it
has been treated as a revolution in the area of agency interpretation.169
Whatever the precise impact of the decision, Chevron has marked an
important change in the form of the deference inquiry. The Skidmore test
was a case-by-case balancing approach in which deference was based on a
variety of judgments about the weight of the agency’s interpretation.170 In
contrast, Chevron purports to be much simpler, condensing this analysis into
two relatively clean questions. 171 Moreover, the questions are based on
analysis of the statute, rather than fraught balancing judgments about the
persuasiveness of the agency interpretation.
What is interesting is that Chevron has not remained two steps in
practice. The complex (and normatively fraught) issues in administrative law
have resulted in subsequent modifications to the doctrine. For example, in
place of Skidmore’s evaluation of the thoroughness of the agency’s
consideration of a given interpretation,172 the Court has created “Step Zero”173

166 Professor Cary Coglianese, however, has argued that Chevron actually contains a number of
“interstitial steps” that structure the space between Step One and Step Two. See Cary Coglianese,
Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (2017).
167 323 U.S. at 140.
168 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
169 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120–22
(2008) (contending that Chevron has had significantly less impact than its status would suggest); Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 30–31 (1998) (finding that Chevron resulted in considerable deference
to agency interpretations).
170 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
171 Though, famously, some have argued that Chevron has only one step. Stephenson & Vermeule,
supra note 55, at 598–600.
172 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
173 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 41, at 873.
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through its decisions in Mead174 and Barnhart.175 The new Step Zero is a
threshold inquiry into whether the agency action is even entitled to claim the
benefits of Chevron deference at all, a new step that the court must ask before
applying the usual two steps. In creating such a step, the Court has reinjected
the consideration of the nature of the executive decision into the inquiry,
seemingly recognizing the need to restore some aspects of the old Skidmore
regime.
Moreover, through the creation of the major questions doctrine, which
functions as an additional off-ramp from Chevron (and thus as arguably
another implicit “step”), the Court has similarly recognized an additional
shortcoming of the stepified test.176 It has fixed this shortcoming, however,
by arguably adding a further step to the test. In Brown & Williamson, the
Court seemed to recognize that there are situations in which an agency
interpretation passes Chevron but in which courts should still not defer to
that interpretation. 177 This can be read as an admission that despite the
stepified simplicity of the two-step Chevron form, its literal application can
occasionally oversimplify hard cases that must then be addressed through
reference to the normative values that the step test imperfectly captures. 178
The major questions doctrine then functions as an additional step to the
inquiry, whereby the court can choose not to apply Chevron (or to disregard
its result) if another condition is met.

174 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that in order for an agency
interpretation to qualify for Chevron deference, Congress must have “delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law” and the agency interpretation must have been
“promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
175 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (“In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal
question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the
question over a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.”).
176 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–61 (2000) (articulating the
major questions doctrine); see also Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV.
129, 167–74 (1993) (cataloging ways in which the Court had avoided applying Chevron).
177 To be sure, there is some dispute about the precise birthdate of the major questions exception. See
Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a
Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 598–
606 (2008) (providing an overview of the cases). Professors Michael Coenen and Seth Davis have argued,
in particular, that Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 120, is really a Step One case in which majorness is
used as an interpretive canon. Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 777, 787–88 (2017). Their narrative suggests that it was really King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473
(2015), that recognized that majorness might give rise to questions in which Chevron might simply not
apply. See Coenen & Davis, supra, at 793.
178 See supra Part II. In this context, the typical hard case I have in mind is one in which the literal
application of the doctrine may sit uneasily with other legal considerations. In contrast, an easy case is
one in which the straightforward application of the doctrine leads to the “right” result.
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Indeed, the creation of these exceptions to Chevron has still not been
enough for some commentators. For example, Justice Brett Kavanaugh has
proposed adding additional structure to the first step of Chevron to discipline
its analysis. 179 In response to Chevron’s encouragement of aggressive
policymaking, 180 Justice Kavanaugh has suggested reorienting Chevron
around an inquiry into whether the statutory language in question has a “best
reading.”181 If so, Justice Kavanaugh suggests that the Court should follow
this reading.182 Only in cases of “statutes using broad and open-ended terms
like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or ‘practicable’” should judges
defer to the policy choice of the agency.183 Essentially, Justice Kavanaugh’s
proposal would alter the shape of Step One, replacing it with a new inquiry
that would be centered around whether the text is open-ended.
It is not just that Chevron has encountered cases that push at its limits,
but that its changes have taken the form of new steps in the analysis.184 For
now, the Court has not retreated to a balancing approach but has instead
attempted to reinforce the multistep analysis via further stepification.
Whether this trend will continue is unclear, but it is telling that the Court
continues to proceed in this way in response to challenges.
Of course, the form of Chevron has been remarked on in the past:
Professor Re has argued that it has important normative implications because
the different statements of Chevron as either a one- or two-step test affect
the normative implications it conveys. 185 Similarly, Professor Cary
Coglianese has argued that the two-step formulation has important
implications for interbranch dialogue as the two distinct steps communicate
information to agencies about the scope of their authority.186 My point in this
Article is not to disagree with Professor Re’s assessment that the form of the
stepified test has important implications—it certainly does—but rather to
question the stepified form more generally. As Professor Re’s article admits,
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Kavanaugh, supra note 11, at 2150–54.
Id. at 2150–51.
181 Id. at 2154.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 2153–54.
184 A depiction of these shifts is shown in infra Figure 5.
185 Re, supra note 59, at 608 (“On reflection, there are important advantages and disadvantages to
traditional Chevron’s command that courts should ask about both mandatoriness and reasonableness in
every case. For example, requiring courts to answer both questions facilitates the rapid development of
the law, but asking only about reasonableness seems consistent with principles of judicial restraint.
Instead of following traditional two-step, perhaps courts should ask only about reasonableness.”).
186 Coglianese, supra note 166, at 1374–86. This argument resembles in interesting ways the
argument I make below about the communicative benefits of multistep tests for appellate courts looking
to provide guidance to lower courts. See infra Section IV.A.
180
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the question of what steps are chosen does matter to the law. The subsequent
examples ask whether there should be steps at all.
B. Lemon
A useful alternative example is the Supreme Court’s Lemon framework
for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges.187 In Lemon, the Court held
that state action is consistent with the Establishment Clause when it meets
three prongs. First, the action in question must have a secular purpose. 188
Second, its “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.”189 Third, the action in question “must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”190
While this framework seems to present a workable method to address
these claims, it has been under significant pressure. This is perhaps because
while the steps as articulated seem to address independent issues, they may
not be as separate as they seem. 191 In particular, difficult Establishment
Clause issues involve combinations of these considerations, suggesting that
the underlying normative issue—when does the state impermissibly impose
religious belief on individuals—cannot be neatly divided up into three truly
independent elements.
One example of this pressure is the application of the test to passive
monuments. In particular, in Van Orden v. Perry, the Justices encountered
the case of a long-standing monument in the shape of the Ten
Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds.192 However, rather than
apply Lemon, four Justices would have held that Lemon is inapplicable to
monuments such as the one in question.193 The plurality stopped short of
overruling Lemon entirely (a move that would have been strange given that
another case decided the same day applied the test 194 ), but the plurality
significantly limited its effect. The controlling opinion in Van Orden, Justice

187

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
Id. at 612.
189 Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
190 Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
191 See infra Section IV.B.
192 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion).
193 Id. at 686 (“Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by
our Nation’s history.”).
194 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–66 (2005) (declining to limit Lemon).
188
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Stephen Breyer’s concurrence, looked to Lemon only as a guidepost, not as
the correct doctrinal test.195
Indeed, in a recent Term, the Supreme Court was asked once again to
reconsider Lemon’s application to a passive monument, this time in the form
of a thirty-foot cross in American Humanist Association.196 This case again
seemed to present the hard question of what to do when a rigid application
of Lemon would require the Court to hold that a nearly 100-year-old
monument must be torn down. 197 In considering the case, four Justices
highlighted the test’s fraught history, noting that “[i]n many cases, this Court
has either expressly declined to apply the test or has simply ignored it”
despite the Lemon Court’s ambition to “provide a framework for all future
Establishment Clause decisions.”198 Those Justices continued to critique the
test’s “shortcomings” but there was no fifth vote to discard the test.199 Still,
the Court ultimately decided that the cross did not violate the Establishment
Clause, further weakening Lemon.
Lemon’s history highlights both the ambitions and drawbacks of
multistep tests, particularly at the Supreme Court level. Its creators attempted
to craft a framework for all Establishment Clause challenges that could be
easily applied. While Lemon captures certain essentials about the
Establishment Clause, a rigid application of its steps leads occasionally to
results that a majority of the Court considers unacceptable. As a result, while
there is no majority to discard the test, the Court is willing to disregard it in
particular cases where its straightforward application would lead to the
“wrong” result.
This demonstrates the limitations of step tests, especially when the
Court is quick to ignore them in certain circumstances. Lemon might be seen
as a case in which the impulse to embrace a multistep approach has led to a
test the Supreme Court feels comfortable regularly departing from, even as
a majority of the Court has been reluctant to depart from Lemon once and for
all. It may be that Lemon serves other goals for the Court, perhaps by

195 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing Lemon as a useful
“guidepost[]” while arguing that “no exact formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases”).
196 See Brief for Petitioner Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission at 22, Am.
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 18-18) (“Because the basic principles of the
Court’s Establishment Clause precedents lead to a clear result, the Court need not apply the Lemon test
here.”).
197 139 S. Ct. at 2074.
198 Id. at 2080 (plurality opinion).
199 Id. at 2080–82; see also id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part) (“Although I agree that rigid
application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem, I think that test’s focus
on purposes and effects is crucial in evaluating government action in this sphere—as this very suit shows.
I therefore do not join Part II–A.”).
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providing useful guideposts for the lower courts. But its history at the
Supreme Court suggests that creation of a multistep regime to govern highly
contested and complicated cases can be a fraught endeavor.
C. Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Interestingly, constitutional criminal procedure has featured open
discussion of the merits of multistep tests and their value to the law. In this
space, the Court has openly addressed the utility of these tests and whether
they appropriately fit the underlying needs of the law. In particular, two
examples in this space illustrate the dynamics of stepification: the evolution
of the Katz test and the rejection of the two-prong test for whether
informants’ tips constitute probable cause.
Of these examples, the test of Katz v. United States200 is undoubtedly
more famous. In Katz, the Court attempted to address how the Fourth
Amendment applied to government surveillance of the defendant’s
conversation in a public telephone booth.201 Because the telephone booth was
outside of the home and arguably in public, the question was how the Fourth
Amendment would apply to this new space. While the Court ultimately held
that the call was protected,202 the case, however, is more famous for Justice
John Marshall Harlan’s concurrence, which stated what would eventually
become an important test for determining the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. Harlan’s formulation imposed a “twofold requirement” for the
Amendment’s protections to apply: “[F]irst that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”203
While Katz continues to be cited approvingly by the Court, its
subsequent history reveals two interesting facets of multistep tests.204 The
first is that its use is subject to qualification because the Katz test is an
imperfect fit for how the Court conceptualizes the Fourth Amendment. For
example, the Court has indicated that the Katz test is not coextensive with
the coverage of the Fourth Amendment and instead serves to supplement the
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389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348–49.
202 Id. at 359 (“These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from
the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he
is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
203 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
204 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (citing Katz as articulating an
important dimension of the Fourth Amendment’s protections).
201
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Amendment’s protection of property. 205 In particular, while the Katz test
describes a set of interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, the
Amendment’s protections stretch beyond Katz to cover other categories of
intrusions. Thus, in effect, an additional step has been added to the test.
Arguably, one must first look to whether some prior interest covers the case.
If the answer to the first question is no, then the court will proceed to apply
the Katz framework. While not fatal, the need to add this additional
qualification indicates the difficulty courts face when attempting to
formulate comprehensive frameworks in this way.206
The second, and more important, issue is that over time, the analysis
under such a test can become wooden. Because multistep tests allow each
factor to be viewed in isolation, the analysis can become detached from the
underlying value the test is supposed to capture.207 This risk is not academic;
in fact, Justice Harlan himself observed it. In United States v. White, Justice
Harlan, in discussing Katz, admonished the Court that “[w]hile . . .
formulations [like Katz] represent an advance over the unsophisticated
trespass analysis of the common law, they too have their limitations and can,
ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for analysis.” 208 These
frameworks have the potential to make decisions more structured, but they
do so at the risk of potentially making decisions too easy for judges who can
march through the steps of a test without actually engaging with the
normative issues in the case.209
The issue of rigidity is addressed in a second issue in criminal law: how
to treat the reliability of informants’ tips. In particular, when are the tips of
informants sufficient to create probable cause for police action? In Illinois v.
Gates, the Supreme Court confronted the application of a “two-prong test”

205 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (“[T]hough Katz may add to the baseline, it does
not subtract anything from the Amendment’s protections ‘when the Government does engage in [a]
physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment))). This is leaving aside those who argue that
the test should be discarded entirely. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Katz
test has no basis in the text or history of the Fourth Amendment. And, it invites courts to make judgments
about policy, not law. Until we confront the problems with this test, Katz will continue to distort Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.”); id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“I would look to a more traditional
Fourth Amendment approach. Even if Katz may still supply one way to prove a Fourth Amendment
interest, it has never been the only way. Neglecting more traditional approaches may mean failing to
vindicate the full protections of the Fourth Amendment.”).
206 See infra Part V (discussing the need to increase the complexity of tests over time to attempt to
fit them appropriately to the values the doctrine aims to implement).
207 See infra Section IV.B.
208 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209 See infra Part IV.
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that had been developed by courts in light of the Supreme Court’s earlier
decisions addressing this issue.210
Instead of embracing the two-prong test, the Court rejected it in favor
of a holistic “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach.211 The Court held that
the nature of probable cause as “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment
of probabilities in particular factual contexts” rendered it “not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”212
Moreover, the Court critiqued how the test separated the two issues of
“reliability” and “basis of knowledge” into “independent channels,” stating:
Instead, they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause
determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other
indicia of reliability.213

The Court noted that a strong showing on one factor could plausibly lead to
the conclusion that only a weaker showing on the other was necessary.214 In
other words, the separation of the individual factors could not be justified
with reference to the underlying normative issue. 215 Therefore, the Court
decided to abandon the test in favor of the holistic approach to the issue in
which all factors were examined together.
Both of these discussions by the Court are exceptionally frank about the
function of multistep tools as methods of jurisprudence. Indeed, these
opinions largely foreshadow the later discussion of the potential pitfalls
inherent in these tests.216 Moreover, while the Katz framework continues to
be deployed, the rejection of the two-step analysis in Gates illustrates how
these frameworks can collapse as well.217

462 U.S. 213, 228 (1983) (“The Illinois Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood
Spinelli as requiring that the [tip] satisfy each of two independent requirements before it could be relied
on.”). This test required that the tip “first had to adequately reveal the ‘basis of knowledge’ of the
[informant]—the particular means by which he came by the information given in his report. Second, it
had to provide facts sufficiently establishing either the ‘veracity’ of the affiant’s informant, or,
alternatively, the ‘reliability’ of the informant’s report in this particular case.” Id. at 228–29.
211 Id. at 230–31.
212 Id. at 232.
213 Id. at 233.
214 Id. at 233–34.
215 See infra Section IV.B.
216 Though the initial decisions of courts to adopt the two-prong approach later rejected by Gates
arguably shows the appeal of these methods. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the benefits of stepified
tests).
217 See infra Section IV.B.
210
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D. Partisan Gerrymandering
While the above examples capture the challenges that stepification
creates when the new multistep tests are unable to effectively express the
normative issues at stake, they also obscure some of the rhetorical
advantages that stepification offers. This dynamic can be observed in the
deployment of stepification as a strategy—though ultimately unsuccessful at
the Supreme Court—to convince courts that workable standards exist to
address partisan gerrymandering.218
The arc of efforts to reform partisan gerrymandering has largely been
one of asking whether judicially manageable standards exist to resolve these
cases.219 In Vieth, four Justices concluded that no such standards existed,220
but Justice Anthony Kennedy consciously left the door open to the
possibility that such standards might emerge at some later time. 221
Consequently, advocates of judicial intervention in partisan gerrymandering
searched for standards that would meet the bar of manageability and, in two
cases decided last Term, presented several possibilities to the Court that they
claimed were manageable.222
In particular, plaintiffs advanced two similar three-prong tests in the
lower courts to deal with partisan gerrymanders. 223 Both tests essentially
asked courts to find a gerrymander unconstitutional if it is (1) motivated by
intent to discriminate against individuals based on their past voting behavior,
(2) has the effect of actually discriminating against these voters, and

218

See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502, 2506–07 (2019) (deciding that partisan
gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable and rejecting the tests proposed to address the issue as
insufficiently “judicially discernible and manageable”).
219 Specifically, the Vieth plurality argued that one limitation placed on courts is that “law
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions.” Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . .”).
220 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion).
221 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]hile understanding that great caution
is necessary when approaching this subject, I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some
limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some
redistricting cases.”).
222 See, e.g., Brief for Appellees League of Women Voters of North Carolina at 50–63, Rucho, 139 S.
Ct. 2484 (No. 18-422) (arguing that the three-part framework of intent, effect and justification meets the
standard for manageability); Brief for Appellees at 31–42, Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726 (U.S. Mar. 4,
2019) (same).
223 Though note that arguably the tests in question are the same. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (“And both courts (like others around the country) used basically the same three-part test
to decide whether the plaintiffs had made out a vote dilution claim. As many legal standards do, that test
has three parts: (1) intent; (2) effects; and (3) causation.”).
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(3) cannot be justified based on the state’s geography or some other
legitimate objective.224 This test found some success as a workable standard
in the lower courts. District courts used it to find partisan gerrymandering
cases justiciable and to rule against extreme cases of gerrymandering,
thinking that a test of this form might prove to be the workable standard for
which the Supreme Court was searching.225
In Common Cause v. Rucho, the League of Women Voters focused on
this three-prong test, arguing that its structure creates a workable framework
for courts to determine which gerrymanders violate the Constitution. 226
Similarly, the appellees in Benisek v. Lamone argued that this test represents
“an appropriate fit” for the court to evaluate these claims.227
Examining the briefs in the case shows the work that the rhetoric of
stepification is doing in these cases. For example, the appellees in the Rucho
case argued that each prong allows the Court to limit the number of
gerrymanders that would be potentially unconstitutional. In their telling, the
intent prong served to restrict the ability of plaintiffs to challenge maps that
incidentally confer an advantage to one side,228 the effects prong ensured that
districts must be considered within the context of the entire map,229 and the
justification prong allowed courts to deny challenges if a set of randomly
generated maps show that the map in question is within the norm for the
state.230
Here, the use of the step test allowed the appellees to show that the need
to prove each and every prong of their test makes the standard itself
manageable. This formulation of the test, however, comes at the cost of not
directly addressing the root of the issue. A map that has significant
224 See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 861–68 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (formulating this
test initially), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); see also League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson,
352 F. Supp. 3d 777, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (adopting the test of the Common Cause v. Rucho court),
rev’d, 902 F.3d 572 (6th Cir.).
225 See sources cited supra note 222.
226 Brief for Appellees League of Women Voters of North Carolina supra note 222, at 50–51.
227
Brief for Appellees, supra note 222, at 26–28. In particular, they have formulated the three prongs
as:

1. Did the State consider citizens’ protected First Amendment conduct with an intent to burden
those citizens because of their political beliefs?
2. If so, did the redistricting map, in fact, dilute the votes of the targeted citizens or disrupt their
political association in a discernable and concrete way?
3. If so, is there a constitutionally acceptable explanation for the map’s ill effects, independent of
the intent to discriminate on the basis of political belief?
Id. at 27–28.
228 Brief for Appellees League of Women Voters of North Carolina, supra note 222, at 52–55.
229 Id. at 55–60.
230 Id. at 60–63.
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discriminatory effects but that is adopted without the requisite intent231 would
still have the sorts of pernicious effects that we might want to ban.232 While
the step test may increase the perception that these claims are “manageable”
because the three prongs are “limited and precise,” this shift might come at
the cost of considering the true nature of the underlying wrong.233
Neither version of the three-prong test convinced a majority of Justices
that it offered workable methods to adjudicate partisan gerrymanders. 234
Nevertheless, their success in the lower courts reveals something interesting
about the intellectual hold that these multistep tests have over judges.
Although it is impossible to prove that the multistep nature of these tests is
causing judges to adopt them as potentially manageable standards for
evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, their form is suggestive. Indeed,
Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent in the case highlights how familiar these sorts
of three-step tests are in the law.235 Although advocates of a multistep test
were ultimately unsuccessful in Rucho, the cases demonstrate the power of
the rhetoric of stepification.
*

*

*

My goal in these examples is to provide instances of a process in action
and to suggest that important commonalities can be observed in cases of
stepification. While these are only four examples of stepification (some of
231 Lower courts have required not only intent to discriminate but for that intent to actually
predominate. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 852 (M.D.N.C. 2018), vacated, 139 S.
Ct. 2484 (2019).
232 To be sure, this is potentially controversial and the intuition turns on what one’s view is of the
reason gerrymanders are bad. If the issue is the intent of the legislature to “rig the game,” then intent is a
“requirement” of an impermissible gerrymander. If, instead, the issue is certain forms of distortion per
se, then perhaps a more flexible test would be beneficial.
233 Of course, for reasons of error costs, we might accept that the test will not cover all the situations
we may actually want as a concession to the limits of the institutional competence of the courts.
234 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019). Though, it is worth noting that there
is ongoing state litigation that will still make these issues salient, even if they are rejected at the Supreme
Court. For example, plaintiffs made similar arguments under the North Carolina constitution for why
these gerrymanders are illegal, with success. See Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001,
2019 WL 4569584, at *1–3 (N.C. Super Ct. Sept. 3, 2019). Similarly, the Pennsylvania supreme court
ruled that the state’s legislative map was unconstitutional based on the state constitution, but interestingly
chose not to adopt a step test and rather stated that it could consider several factors in determining whether
a given gerrymander was unconstitutional. See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth,
178 A.3d 737, 815–18 (Pa. 2018) (stating that the court would consider “(1) the population of such
districts must be equal, to the extent possible; (2) the district that is created must be comprised of compact
and contiguous geographical territory; and (3) the district respects the boundaries of existing political
subdivisions . . . [and] divides as few of those subdivisions as possible”).
235 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (highlighting that many tests take this three-step
form).
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which include a move away from multistep tests), I believe that the evolution
of these regimes suggests that there may be common normative implications
of stepification. Other examples, including the relaxation of the three-prong
standing doctrine236 in the case of states237 and the development of the twostep strict scrutiny analysis,238 further support this general trend.
In particular, stepification, while separate from the rules-versusstandards debate, has the advantage of its rule-like rhetoric. It distills issues
that may have moving normative parts into simpler legal inquiries. For this
reason, stepification may seem attractive to those who observe that an area
of the law is chaotic. Stepification seems to impose order upon the chaos.
This has made stepification an important tool for advocates against partisan
gerrymandering to combat the perception that adjudication of these claims
will lead to chaos. But stepification also has important drawbacks, making
its normative valence ambiguous. The next Part turns to this question.
IV. THE UNEASY CASE FOR (AND AGAINST) STEPIFICATION
This Article does not argue that stepified tests are necessarily unhelpful.
In some cases, they offer helpful frameworks for decisions and increase
clarity. However, these advantages should not be mistaken for a strong case
that stepification represents a universal solution to the problem of legal
decision-making. This Part aims to briefly discuss some of the benefits and
costs of stepification and to suggest that, while a strong case can be made for
it in some circumstances, the general case for it is unclear.
A. The Case for Steps
Stepification has normative benefits that are important to highlight,
even as this Article suggests that they are not as compelling as they might
initially appear. In particular, four arguments in favor of these tests present
themselves: (1) their value as rhetorical rules, (2) the ability to make easy
cases of law easy in practice, (3) their ability to organize legal argumentation,
and (4) their ability to give direction to lower courts. Importantly, some of
these benefits are very similar to the purported advantages of bright-line
rules. Stepification, then, might be seen as a judicial technology that allows
these benefits to be imported to situations in which a bright-line rule cannot
236

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (noting that states are entitled to
“special solicitude” for the purposes of standing inquiries).
238 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (“Justice Douglas’s phrase caught on and
eventually became increasingly formalized into a two ‘prong’ test now referred to as ‘strict scrutiny’ or
‘compelling interest’ analysis.”).
237
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be formulated and indeed where the individual steps might be standards.
Still, this Section charts how stepified tests achieve these benefits and
suggests some important ways in which multistep tests may subtly differ
from bright-line rules.
First, despite any misgivings about these tests, they have the potential
to create the perception of order for litigants. Leaving aside whether or not
stepification actually creates order in practice, these tests may enhance the
legitimacy of the law by clarifying why a particular litigant won or lost and
creating the impression that the law is rule-like.239 In contrast to more openended balancing, the winners and losers in a stepified regime are more easily
able to discern the reasons for the verdict in any particular case. In particular,
they should be able to easily point to the step (or steps) on which they lost.
To the extent that this enhances public opinion of the law and those who
enforce it, this might be a benefit for the legal system in general, even if it
comes at the cost of certain individual cases being decided differently.
Indeed, in many areas, as recently shown in the partisan gerrymandering
space,240 courts may be reluctant to intervene where they perceive that they
will not be able to articulate reasons for their decisions that will be
convincing to observers. To the extent that stepification resolves these issues,
it may represent a useful judicial technology.241
To be sure, enhanced legitimacy may be harmful it if is based on a false
perception. In particular, overconfidence in the reliability of legal judgments
may make the populace less likely to search for ways to improve the legal
system.242 In particular, this dynamic may take on a darker tone if judicial
rhetoric exists only to provide cover for elites to engage in politics by other
means at the expense of the larger populace.

See Scalia, supra note 128, at 1178–79 (“When a case is accorded a different disposition from an
earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be
different, but that it be seen to be so. . . . Much better, even at the expense of the mild substantive
distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point
to in explanation of the decision.”).
240 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 39–40, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 18-422) (citing courts’
“persistent inability to discern any manageable standards for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering
claims” and arguing that therefore the claims should be nonjusticiable).
241 We can and should question whether this perception that these tests offer neutral ways to articulate
reasons is more context dependent than it may initially appear. It could certainly be true that the issue
here is somewhat circular and that individuals have been conditioned to think of these modes of decisionmaking as more official than they really are.
242 Cf. RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 162–64 (2019) (noting that in the context
of constitutions, there is evidence to suggest “veneration” of the “constitutional status quo” makes
individuals less likely to support amendments, though constitutional cultures do exist in which frequent
constitutional change occurs and so a culture of reform becomes embedded in what individuals venerate
about the constitution).
239
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But the question of whether legitimacy is good or bad ultimately turns
on whether the legal system itself is worthy of such veneration. Professor
Tom Tyler has demonstrated that individuals often feel a strong obligation
to obey the law even if they feel it is unjust.243 Further, the perception that a
process has been procedurally fair is independently a source of legitimacy
for the system outside of whether favorable outcomes for the individual
occurred. 244 To the extent stepification increases judgments of procedural
fairness—a question perhaps deserving of separate study—then we should
ask whether the underlying system is deserving of those benefits.
Second, these tests arguably help make easy cases easier, even if they
struggle to appropriately capture the interesting dimensions of the more
difficult questions of law.245 While the proportion of easy and hard cases is
context dependent, the ability to invoke a particular portion of the analysis
to explain why one party lost can potentially save time by creating
conceptual clarity. While these tests arguably flatten and simplify certain
areas of the law, this simplicity can sometimes be a boon for judges working
to resolve cases that are more straightforward.
Third, and perhaps more convincing, these tests provide useful ways to
organize legal argumentation. A test that is divided into multiple clear steps
gives parties and prospective litigants a natural way to structure their
thinking on a given issue and to organize their briefing. While easing the
work of lawyers is not necessarily a reason to alter the structure of legal rules,
the benefit to regulated parties may still be substantial if the clarity offered
by a step test offers them a way to structure their behavior so as to avoid
violating the law.
This third benefit is tied to the first one. To the extent that briefing
aligns with the actual decision process of the court, rhetorical efficiency can
be achieved. For example, say the parties know that three questions matter:
the court can reply that, in fact, the plaintiffs won because of the result of
question two and organize the analysis to this effect. This means that courts
can also decline to address questions that they do not want to answer by
appealing to other parts of the step test, an option not available under a

243

TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 46 (1990).
Id. at 77–79.
245 Professor Kaplow makes a similar point, though he notes that in cases where the analysis
terminates it does so because the answer is wrong. Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules, supra note 22,
at 1000–03. This is not the case for general multistep tests because steps one and two are not necessarily
balanced against each other. Thus, the law can fail to be clearly established and the plaintiff fails without
the test resulting in an error.
244
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balancing approach.246 This can also help limit the insertion of dicta into
opinions.247
Fourth and finally, step tests provide appellate courts with a method to
structure and monitor the actions of lower courts. By forcing courts to
articulate reasons in this form, the reviewing court also gains some ability to
oversee the actions of the lower courts.248 A higher court can perhaps more
easily detect errors or areas of disagreement because it will be able to identify
the part of the test on which it disagrees with the lower court. 249 More
directly, stepification can make the decisions of lower courts more legible
by organizing their reasoning in a way that is easier for appellate courts to
monitor and evaluate and to which parties can point when identifying
errors.250 To the extent that the appeals process exists to discipline lower
court discretion, stepification may further enable that process.
It is possible to sketch a model of this dynamic mathematically by
comparing a three-factor balancing test to a three-prong step test. In each
balancing decision, the appellate court will compute the three factors and
convert these three results into a final outcome in the case. The lower court
will then have guidance in two ways. First, it can compart the case before it
to the appellate decision on each of the three factors. Second, if the case
before the lower court is somehow “stronger” on each factor then the result

246 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727–28 (2014) (declining to
adjudicate whether the contraceptive mandate served a compelling governmental interest by concluding
that the action violated the second step of the test requiring that it was not the least restrictive means to
serve that interest).
247 I do not mean to say this will always be the case. For a court to explain why a party satisfies all
the steps it must indeed discuss all steps the parties contest. In contrast, it might be that a party makes
such a strong showing on one factor of a multifactor balancing test that the other factors are rendered
irrelevant. Indeed, Professor Barton Beebe has argued that in the context of multifactor test for trademark
infringement, judges will make a small number of factors dispositive and then stampede quickly over the
rest. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1581, 1586–87 (2006).
248 This might also take the form of limiting further doctrinal development on top of the stepified
test. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 658–60 (2014) (discussing the
notion of rules against rulification, in which an appellate court forbids lower courts from attempting to
convert a standard into a rule). While Professor Coenen’s analysis focuses on the building of further rules
on top of an existing framework, we can see here a desire for the courts to preserve the structure of an
existing regime rather than to allow deviations.
249 Cf. Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules, supra note 22, at 1050 (arguing that in cases where
both balancing and structured processes require the reviewer to assess harms and benefits against a
threshold, it does not seem as though it would constrain discretion). Where the test focuses on questions
of law rather than fact, the result may be different.
250 Cf. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 2–6, 183–84 (1998) (examining how the notion of
legibility and how the state can or cannot order affairs to enable those affairs to be tracked by the state
both facilitate administration and can lead to failure).
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will be clear.251 If, however, a comparison of the factors produced a more
complicated result, the lower court will have to choose how to resolve the
case.
In contrast, for each multistep case (where the court completes the
steps), the lower court is given guidance on each of the three steps, all of
which are potentially dispositive about the case. The lower court similarly
knows that if its case has the same combination of answers to the steps, then
the result will be clear.252
While an individual multistep decision and individual balancing
decision have a similar result on instructions to the lower court, as the
appellate decisions add up, the multistep decisions have greater cumulative
effect. Each multistep decision provides a new boundary for each individual
step, each of which can be dispositive.253 In contrast, each balancing decision
provides a new input on each factor but can still leave it unclear how novel
combinations of factors should be evaluated. The result is more openness to
individualized judgment when such new combinations present themselves.
Channeling lower court discretion in this way potentially leads to
greater uniformity in the law in the sense that lower courts apply the law in
the way the appellate court would.254 This is not to imply that lower courts
are attempting to subvert the will of other tribunals. But a multistep test
allows precedent to build around individual questions. Thus, the Supreme
Court can issue opinions on what it means for the law to be “clearly
established” for the purposes of qualified immunity, for example. In contrast,
under a balancing regime each precedent tells us less about the interplay of
factors when reaching the final result, offering less guidance to lower courts.
Note that the dynamics of appeal matter here too. Appellate tribunals
also provide guidance to lawyers looking to advise their clients. To the extent

251 We can think of the appellate decision as coding a case in three-dimensional space where each
axis represents a factor. This coding not only tells us about this point but also tells us about the “cone” of
points that are more extreme than it is on all three factors. Still, if a new case presents a stronger showing
on two factors but a weaker showing on one factor, then the appellate case is not strictly dispositive of
the result, though it may be close enough that the court can reason by analogy.
252 In this sense, the individual multistep decision cuts out the same cone because it sets up three
inequalities in the three-dimensional space. This is because on each individual question, the lower court
is given a single answer—assume it is “yes”—and can then conclude that anything more extreme has the
same answer. It cannot, however, necessarily determine in the other direction when yes would become
no.
253 Assuming, that is, that the court actually proceeds through all the steps.
254 Cf. Coenen, supra note 248, at 685 (noting that restrictions on imposing structure on mandatory
standards limits doctrinal experimentation). Professor Peter Strauss also has argued that Chevron may
function as a management tool to increase the Supreme Court’s control over lower courts. Peter L. Strauss,
One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1987).
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that multistep tests make errors more legible to the appellate court, they also
make them more legible to lawyers who can provide their clients with more
definitive advice about their chance of success in a costly appeal. “The court
got it wrong on step one” is, I believe, more definitive than “the appellate
court will likely balance the factors in our favor.” That said, I don’t want to
overstate this point. Some analysis of multifactor balancing tests in practice
do find that judges zero in on a few factors. 255 But even if this is so, the
question still remains whether the choice of factors is consistent or whether
the multistep test still produces more coherence.256
While these benefits seem largely procedural, they are arguably more
substantive than they initially appear. Consistency does matter in the law
and, as such, so do improvements in the ability of the parties and courts to
focus themselves on the right questions. At the same time, there are reasons
to believe that uninterrogated acceptance of these tests has normative costs,
or at least important implications.
B. The Trouble with Stepification
Despite the advantages of stepification detailed above, it is by no means
a blind endorsement of the step regime. In particular, we should be skeptical
of an unthinking acceptance of stepified tests as a superior option to
balancing tests. My critique here applies to the general category of step tests
rather than any individual one,257 and therefore it necessarily sweeps fairly
broadly. We can identify three issues with the general trend of stepification.
The first argument against these tests is that they flatten certain normative
elements of the law into a more rigid, procedural structure, potentially
obscuring important elements of the issue itself. This leads to several related
problems, including the bleeding of the supposedly isolated prongs of the
test into each other and the tendency to create complexity over time. Second,
they may impart artificial simplicity to decisions. Third, they may overly

255 See Beebe, supra note 247, at 1586 (“[J]udges employ fast and frugal heuristics to short-circuit
the multifactor test. Perhaps as an expression of their cognitive limitations, but more likely as an
expression of their cognitive ingenuity, judges rely upon a few factors or combinations of factors to make
their decisions. The rest of the factors are at best redundant and at worst irrelevant.” (footnote omitted)).
256 Professor Beebe’s analysis is interesting on this point. He does find that the circuits themselves
seem to have standards about which factor matters most but that the answer varies by circuit. Id. at 1598–
99. In this case, there is partial uniformity within circuits but not national uniformity. Id.
257 Of course, a wealth of critiques of individual stepified regimes exists. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer,
Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986) (critiquing an
overbroad reading of Chevron); Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing
and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 428 & n.121 (2009) (arguing that
the optional sequencing of the two steps of the qualified immunity analysis inquiry decreases the rate of
constitutional adjudication).
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constrain lower courts in the development of the law. Thus, the drawbacks
of stepification largely mirror its advantages.
1. Flattened Normative Dimensions
The most important objection to stepification is that it presumes an
orthogonal structure to the decision at hand and sometimes also a
lexicographical ordering of the issues. Both of these assumptions, while
defensible in some cases, are normatively problematic in others. First,
stepification assumes that some issues can be cleanly separated from others.
That is, it is possible to reduce the overall issue to several logically separate
prongs that can be evaluated without reference to the other inquiries. Second,
stepification, by ordering the issues in question, can implicitly assume the
priority of one over the other, both normatively and practically.
To deal with the former assumption first, stepification requires that the
issue in question—the one the test is designed to resolve—can be severed in
a particular way. That is, stepification of the normative issue the law attempts
to regulate via a multistep test implicitly assumes that the factors captured
by the prongs can be normatively evaluated separately. Alternatively stated,
the multistep form presumes that the degree to which a party prevails is
irrelevant to whether she ought to prevail on the subsequent steps. But
whether such walls exist is a normative question, and where the walls do not
obviously exist a normative judgment is imposed.258 In the case of traditional
multielement offenses, this requirement may be satisfied. However, in issues
with more complicated normative dimensions, this feature should not be
taken for granted.
To make this observation more concrete, we can consider a graphical
representation of stepification. Multistep tests assume the issues can be
separated from each other for the purpose of decision-making. It may be true
that the way in which a previous step is resolved will influence the starting
point for later steps, but the results of previous steps of the inquiry will be
taken as a given for the purpose of subsequent analysis. As a result, multistep

258 Another way to state this is to say that where an issue is “modular” it can be more easily rendered
into a multistep test. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1701
(2012) (describing property law as a modular system in which “chunks or components of the system to
be partially walled off and the interconnections between these chunks and the rest of the system to be
deliberately limited (sometimes even at the expense of interdependencies that might have some value)”).
Professor Smith argues that modularity is then a way of managing complexity as interactions between
components are limited. Id. Professor Smith’s work has an important echo in some of the mathematical
language used here about orthogonality. At a high level of generality, some mathematical structures can
be decomposed into smaller components that can be then examined individually. Courts imposing
multistep tests on an area of doctrine are doing something similar in my telling: while a single rule or
standard might not fit the problem, a sequence of them might. This modularity can then manage
complexity in the way Professor Smith describes.
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tests essentially posit that the inquiries are orthogonal with one issue
unrelated to each other, creating the framework in Figure 3:
FIGURE 3: ORTHOGONAL QUESTIONS IN A TWO-STEP TEST

We can then depict a hypothetical range of outcomes that pass the test
and others that do not. For example, a situation that might be more amenable
to balancing is depicted in Figure 4:

435

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 4: MAPPING A TWO-STEP TEST TO OUTCOMES

Figure 4 presents a highly stylized picture of the issue with
stepification. 259 Because the decision-maker is forced to answer each
question separately, they must draw individual lines for each question. The
result is that the resulting space of outcomes that pass the test may not match
the underlying desired results, excluding some outcomes that we might wish
to admit and allowing certain actions that might be undesirable. 260 For
example, consider the form of the qualified immunity test.261 If we assume
the test is intended to protect officers who act in good faith, the test can be

259 Note that the lines in question must be orthogonal to the axis they correspond to for each question
to be truly independent of the answer of the former. One could imagine them bending together or being
slanted, but this would be to allow the two questions to bleed into each other. As discussed later in this
Section and in infra Part V, I believe that in practice courts are forced to bend the lines to accommodate
cases that stretch the limits of the test, but to do so is to deform the values of stepification. Of course, the
end result might be a better fit for the landscape and therefore may produce superior results. It only does
so, however, by reproducing the balancing analysis that stepification is designed to replace.
260 One way to think about this issue is that the process of jurisprudence has elements that are
topological in the mathematical sense. That is, the formulation of legal rules (whether done by courts or
the legislature) is done to both reshape and respond to the special qualities of the underlying issue.
Sometimes, the issue will have a structure that admits a particular jurisprudential approach (whether a
bright-line rule or a multistep test) and in other cases it will not.
261 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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both underinclusive and overinclusive.262 It might protect officers who act in
bad faith where the law is not clearly established while also offering no
protection to officers acting in good faith where there is a precedent in a
complicated area of law that the officer is unaware of—perhaps because the
decision is recent.
The preceding analysis highlights a further point: the degree to which a
multistep test fails depends on the underlying value it is intended to capture.
Importantly, if the text is identified with the value it aims to capture then
there will be no imperfection. For example, if we decide that officers should
only be liable for clearly established constitutional violations, then qualified
immunity will be a perfect fit for the problem. Like many doctrinal
formulations though, multistep tests will frequently fit the underlying subject
matter imperfectly. In particular, where at the margin the factors captured by
the steps should be balanced, a multistep test will fail to always reach the
right results.263 Still, multistep tests may offer a way to simplify decisions in
the majority of cases, but issues of fit may plague the boundaries.
A concrete example helps illustrate the point. Consider the
gerrymandering cases discussed above. The proposed tests purported to limit
the need for court involvement by using individual prongs to carve out
categories of gerrymanders that would be exempt from their coverage. 264
While this approach is all well and good in the abstract, it seems to flatten
some issues that we may find normatively significant. For example, what
about a map that was made with purely invidious intent but is one among
many that could be explained by the state’s geography? Perhaps as a
pragmatic matter, this is an inquiry that is better suited to political resolution,
but as a normative matter, is it any less offensive to the democratic process?
Similarly, would a map with dramatic partisan effects, no explanation from
the state’s political geography, but no evidence of intent be inoffensive to
constitutional values (if not doctrine)? 265 No matter how well suited to a
262 This may be a controversial account of what the modern test is intended to protect. The modern
test might serve other goals. I choose this value here both to illustrate the point as well as because it is
rooted in the history of the test. That is, the modern qualified immunity test replaced the prior standard
that explicitly based immunity in good faith because the Court found that explicit consideration of
subjective motivations allows insubstantial claims to proceed to trial. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815–17 (1982).
263 Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules, supra note 22, at 1050–55.
264 See supra Section III.D.
265 Note that I do not mean to suggest that current doctrine would take this approach, and it is wellknown that there are no disparate impact claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 246–48 (1976). My point is that an ideal legal prohibition (perhaps crafted by the
legislature) might rule out various maps that cannot meet all three prongs of the suggested test where they
are sufficiently offensive to an individual one. And they might do so because the individual steps are not
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given problem the proposed tests were, by separating the elements of the
inquiry, they overlook critical interactions. In particular, because an issue
must pass each step of the test individually, cases can occur that barely
satisfy the test but which offend the underlying value the test aims to protect.
Going further, the Lemon inquiry has arguably broken down because its
factors are not approximately independent of each other. 266 If there is an
entanglement between the different elements of a given issue, the steps of
the test erase that relationship. Because a court is bound to apply every step
individually, it cannot look at the nexus of the issues in question. Thus, when
cases that are a poor fit for the test are presented, they force adjustments or
abandonment of the test. While Lemon may resolve many of the core cases
to which it is intended to be applied, the issues at its boundaries may create
long-run issues for its viability. For example, the issues in Van Orden and
the more recent American Humanist Association presented the Court with
cases in which Lemon seemed to produce the wrong result in the minds of a
majority of the court.267
One solution here is to let the factors bleed into each other, balancing
one against the other to compensate for these issues. But this solution
essentially sacrifices the desirable property of the step test that keeps these
issues separate. Once one accepts that the issues are not entirely separate, the
test begins to collapse towards balancing once more, undermining the
viability of the entire enterprise. While the new modified test might retain
some of the rhetorical benefits of stepification, it would forfeit the
intellectual advantages stepification is supposed to create.268
Of course, stepified regimes are not always destined to collapse because
of some internal tension between the factors. Again, with certain issues, the
separation between issues is clear. And, in general, situations that mirror the
multielement offenses found in criminal law that require a showing of both
the requisite mens rea and actus reus seem naturally fit for stepification.
Though even here, the criminal law accomplishes this natural separation by
grading crimes rather than by applying a simple two-step test.269
necessarily akin to on–off switches but capture different values about how districts should be drawn, not
all of which are necessary to conclude that a given map offends democratic values.
266 See supra Section III.B.
267 See supra notes 192–199 and accompanying text.
268 See supra Section IV.A.
269 For example, a pure stepification approach would look first to some level of mens rea and then
look for the actus reus. But the criminal law realizes that this sort of yes–no approach would risk treating
very different normative situations as identical crimes. Therefore, the mens rea question will often
determine the grade of the crime rather than determining whether there is a crime at all. This use of the
question for tiering is distinct from stepification because it departs from the usual yes–no structure of the
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Instead, the central problems arise in areas in which the creation of steps
serves to flatten an issue into artificial inquiries that fail to capture the
complete picture. For example, consider Justice Kavanaugh’s proposed
refinement of Chevron.270 Justice Kavanaugh’s alternative still features steps,
but he alters the nature of the inquiry to focus on the issues he believes are
more naturally handled by judges.271 Leaving aside whether this proposed
change is an improvement over the current test, Justice Kavanaugh’s
proposal is revealing because it shows that the issue of deference to the
executive branch is not so neatly diced into any particular categories. Rather,
the nature of the issue at hand as well as its complexity admit alternative
categorizations of the issues. In the language of management discussed
above, an alternative decision tree may be posited to resolve the issue. 272
Thus, any specification of the issues in a stepified form likely requires a
choice among alternatives that will have normative implications for the
functioning of the test.
This point has two main implications. First, stepification may lead to
errors. Within the rigidity of a given regime, there might be cases that
narrowly answer each element of the inquiry without actually satisfying the
underlying normative goal of the legal regime in question. In some sense,
they would be right on each part of the test, but wrong when looked at as a
whole. Indeed, this is one way to characterize major questions doctrine cases.
In these cases, the agency interpretation literally passes the test but might
seem to be doing so in some way that violates some other background
principle of the limits of agency power to decide, well, major issues. While
certainly debate can be had over the result of individual cases and their
doctrinal implications, one way to read them is as an admission that the sum
of the parts can be wrong in a way that the individual parts were not.273 If
stepification leads to issues falling through the cracks in this way, we might
look less favorably upon it.
Indeed, Professor Kaplow argues that the structured decision
procedures he studies have precisely this effect. In cases where they actually

typical multistep test. That said, as many students of criminal law have realized over the years, this process
can be helpfully expressed in a decision-tree framework. Thus, an approach mirroring the use of decision
frameworks in criminal law is one way I suggest courts could move beyond stepification. See infra
Section V.B.
270 See supra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
271 Kavanaugh, supra note 11, at 2154 (“But in cases where an agency is instead interpreting a
specific statutory term or phrase, courts should determine whether the agency’s interpretation is the best
reading of the statutory text. Judges are trained to do that, and it can be done in a neutral and impartial
manner in most cases.”).
272 See supra Section II.B.2.
273 See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text.
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reduce effort, they do so by reaching the wrong answer.274 In all other cases,
the court must proceed through the different steps regardless.275 There is no
real efficiency gain because simplification only leads to errors.
Second, because complex issues do not admit stepification in some
natural way, alternative step tests can be formulated that may lead to
different results. In such cases, the choice of test itself will have important
normative implications. The decision will not end at whether to choose a
multistep test but will extend to which test to use. And the choice of test itself
might have implications for how the inquiry is structured and the subsequent
system that is built up around that choice.
To illustrate this point, consider the steps proffered in the
gerrymandering cases discussed above. The choice of the first step—whether
there is intent276—is a normative one. We can imagine a test that does not
look at intent but instead only assesses impact. We could also imagine a test
that starts with impact before moving on to other considerations. But by
designing a step test that, first, makes intent a consideration and, second,
makes it the first consideration (this has important lexicographic
implications discussed below), courts implicitly impute certain value
judgments into the step test. In this case, a value judgment implicit in this
test is that the primary ill in gerrymandering is the intent, not the practical
impact on the ability of citizens to participate in competitive elections.
Therefore, with issues that have a deep moral valence, not only does deciding
whether to adopt a step test import normative judgments, but also which
steps to use carries important normative implications.277
One can see a related issue in the effort of the Supreme Court to work
through the implications of its decision in Miranda v. Arizona.278 Miranda is
now known for its famous warnings, not as a multistep test. The opinion
itself, however, implicitly set up such a test that was later taken up by lower
courts, requiring the warnings to be issued in the case of “custodial
interrogation.” 279 But then one must ask: what are (1) custody and

274

Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules, supra note 22, at 1002.
Id. at 1000–03.
276 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
277 To be sure, doctrine may be an imperfect expression of underlying moral concerns. I therefore do
not want to imply that the choice of doctrinal form necessarily implies that advocates (or courts)
automatically believe that intent is the primary issue with gerrymandering whenever they suggest this
test. But even so, there is still a message that is expressed by the choice of the steps, even if the test’s
creators or advocates privately think otherwise.
278 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
279 Id. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” (footnote omitted)).
275
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(2) interrogation. This sets up a two-step test, though the steps are unordered.
A substantial amount of work, however, must go into interpreting those
factors. In some cases, there is no custody and so the warnings do not
apply. 280 In other cases, the court needed to interpret the meaning of
interrogation, sometimes introducing new branches of the analysis 281 and
other times introducing exceptions to situations that passed the literal test.282
Thus, where a multistep test is formulated to organize the law around a
complicated issue, it may require appellate courts to build out ever more
multistep tests within individuals steps of the original formulation,
necessitating once more the choices I argue are occasionally fraught.
The second, related difficulty with stepification is its lexicographic
ordering of issues. Mathematically, a lexicographic ordering of issues is one
in which a given dimension of an issue is deemed more important than
another for the purposes of ordering. Thus, that dimension is evaluated first
to resolve any decisions, and only if it fails to resolve the issue are further
dimensions considered.283
Step tests often seem to imply that one issue has priority over another—
though sequencing is sometimes optional.284 In some cases the mandatory
sequencing of the steps is a product of logical necessity. For example, there
is often an implicit need in the law for an analytical step zero.285 However,
that need should not be mistaken for the conclusion that steps are more
generally neutral in their order. Rather, the separation of issues into a given
order creates (and may imply that the issue implicitly has) a structure that
has important consequences for the law in general. Thus, even in cases where
the steps could theoretically be addressed in either order, the choice to order
the issues in one way or another shapes how subsequent decision-makers
will approach the problem. For example, in the gerrymandering example
discussed above, the choice to address intent first may lead to fewer
decisions that interpret the impact prong if courts skip over this analysis after
280

See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984) (holding that traffic stops did not constitute
custody for Miranda purposes).
281 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (“We conclude that the Miranda
safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.”). This sets up an additional step in the analysis. After the custody question there
are now two yes–no ways in which someone can be interrogated.
282 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (holding that a subject asked booking
questions was interrogated for the purpose of Miranda but that these questions fell into a “routine booking
question” exception).
283 A lexicographic ordering can order further dimensions as well. The second can be deemed
superior to the third, the third to the fourth, and so on.
284 For example, this is the case in the qualified immunity context. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 234–36 (2009) (holding that lower courts may address the second step of the test first).
285 See supra Section I.A.
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the plaintiff fails on the first step. Moreover, this property has significant
implications for step tests, including how they evolve to compensate for
deficiencies in their application.
Most important, steps can force decisions that might not otherwise be
made or even evade decisions altogether. For example, Professor Re
observes that a two-step Chevron test forces courts to opine on both the
ambiguity of a term as well as the interpretation the agency offers. 286
Similarly, the breakdown of the mandatory sequencing of the qualified
immunity two-step test has had implications for how courts evaluate such
claims.287
While step tests need not resolve all issues at once, or even in a given
order, the fact that they often do order decisions in this way is still significant.
It matters whether the court reaches certain issues as does the structure of
questions.288 Which issues must be addressed first informs which issues will
bind future courts and which will inform legal scholarship.289
Of course, certain issues necessarily have a logical structure of priority.
To point to ordering as an issue that arises in stepification is not to say that
ordering issues are per se negative. The problem occurs when ordering can
obscure important dimensions of an issue in the process of attempting to
formalize the law in question. Step tests do not have to be ordered (and in
fact in some cases they break down by eliminating order),290 but where they
are, the order in question has important implications.
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of these issues is Chevron. One way
to state the goal of the doctrine in the abstract would be as follows: statutes
often leave certain issues underdetermined and, within reason, the Executive
Branch should be allowed to fill those gaps in the statutory scheme. What
then is the merit of the two-step test? In the language of my thesis, it creates
a useful framework for implementing an underlying view about the propriety
of agency statutory interpretation, but its model is imperfect. In particular, it
has the fitting problem that is depicted in Figure 4, in the sense that a literal
application of the test seems to allow certain actions that seem like they

286 Re, supra note 59, at 608 (“On reflection, there are important advantages and disadvantages to
traditional Chevron’s command that courts should ask about both mandatoriness and reasonableness in
every case. For example, requiring courts to answer both questions facilitates the rapid development of
the law, but asking only about reasonableness seems consistent with principles of judicial restraint.”).
287 Hughes, supra note 257, at 428 & n.121.
288 Re, supra note 59, at 608.
289 For example, if Step One of Chevron resolves most of the issues, commentary is sure to focus on
step one and what will meet that burden.
290 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–36 (2008) (relaxing the rigid framework in
favor of a more flexible inquiry).
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should be restricted.291 Thus, the test must be bent and modified to cover its
deficiencies. The factors must be allowed to bleed into each other—akin to
allowing the lines in Figure 4 to bend—or additional steps must be added
over time to compensate for its issues—akin to adding additional lines. In
essence, this description can be seen to generalize the issues that have
plagued Chevron to the general setting of multistep tests. This description
also shows how multistep tests can encounter difficulties over time.
To some, these remarks may seem somewhat overwrought, focused on
abstract issues of form rather than the substance of the issue in question. Yet
form matters.292 While much can be said about the individual doctrinal tests
surveyed, the point of this Article is that there is a thread connecting the
issues in question. Steps both separate issues and order them. Sometimes this
shift is useful for courts, but in other cases the separation and ordering have
unintended consequences because of their imperfect fit with underlying
issues. Most important, the specific way in which multistep tests struggle has
important implications for how they eventually break down. The particular
issues they encounter lead courts to modify them in ways that affect their
ultimate form over time, particularly when the test addresses a controversial
issue.293
2. Easing Decisions
As a second matter, even if stepification does not lead to a proliferation
of errors, we might wonder whether there are costs to the appearance of ease

291 For example, Professors Shoba Wadhia and Christopher Walker argue that the rationale for
Chevron is weakest in immigration enforcement. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker,
The Case Against Chevron Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1201 (2021). In
such cases, they argue that even if the agency reaches an interpretation of the law through adjudication
that can satisfy Chevron, the traditional rationale for deferring to such agency interpretations is
particularly weak. Id. at 1201–02. They call instead for Skidmore deference in such cases. Id. at 1202–
03. Though their argument against Chevron in such contexts is procedural, not substantive, id. at 1202,
for this proposal to have an impact it will have to impact cases in which the result from applying Chevron
differs from that which would be reached by balancing in the way Figure 4 illustrates. In other words, the
procedural considerations the Professors identify give us reasons to not defer in cases where Chevron is
overinclusive or underinclusive. For a different example, opponents of qualified immunity often point to
cases where the doctrine shields officers from liability even where the facts of the constitutional violation
seem egregious. See, e.g., David Deerson, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, NAT’L REV. (July 13,
2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/the-case-against-qualified-immunity/
[https://perma.cc/5UDM-9CQQ]. In doing so, these critics are not arguing that the court in question
applies the doctrine wrong, but that the application of the current formulation is flawed because its proper
application still leads to certain bad outcomes at the extremes.
292 For example, Justice Scalia’s famous case for preferring rules over standards is an example of
how the Justice considered form to be important even abstracted away from the substance of individual
cases. Scalia, supra note 128, at 1178–79. For a recent project arguing that legal doctrine and the way in
which it is formulated is itself worthy of study, see SCHLAG & GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 4.
293 See infra Part V.
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in certain cases. Consider again the issue in Brown & Williamson: if the
Court had concluded that the agency interpretation satisfied Chevron, would
this necessarily be a satisfying reason to accept such a dramatic change to
the law? Even accepting the wisdom of Chevron, there is perhaps something
unsatisfying about explaining the solution to a “major question” as a matter
of a clear two-step process. To the extent that stepification makes easy cases
easy, it also can make hard cases (seemingly) easy as well,294 perhaps at the
cost of the ability to persuade observers.
To suggest that such a rhetorical simplification of complex issues has
normative implications is not novel. In his Harvard Law Review foreword,
Professor Dan Kahan has observed that judicial opinions are often
problematically simplistic. 295 Professor Kahan observes that, contrary to
certain intuitions, such certainty is deeply problematic.296 Indeed, certainty
can deepen conflict rather than alleviating it.297
While this is not an Article about writing opinions, Professor Kahan’s
conclusions apply here as well. Stepification simplifies areas of the law and,
in doing so, simplifies the opinions that are issued by courts deciding those
issues. To the extent that Professor Kahan is correct about the limitations of
this sort of certitude about the law, the articulation of simple solutions to
complex issues may have unintended drawbacks for decision-makers
looking to persuade observers. In particular, opinions that are too neat and
tidy might make certain litigants feel as though their concerns have been
dismissed. Thus, the simplification offered by multistep tests might be both
a virtue and a vice.298
Thus, even though something is potentially gained through
stepification, there might be important normative losses to this sort of
rigidity. These losses may lead to errors in substantive cases, but they also
may appear when we consider the process value of reason-giving. The cost
of neat conceptual boxes is that they might sometimes obscure more than
they reveal. Stepification is no different.

294

See supra Section IV.A.
Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (2011) (“Judicial
opinions are notoriously—even comically—unequivocal. It is rare for opinions to acknowledge that an
issue is difficult, much less that there are strong arguments on both sides.”).
296 Id. at 60.
297 Id. (“But in fact, the opposite is more likely true. Studies of motivated cognition and related
dynamics show that pronouncements of certitude deepen group-based conflict.”).
298 See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for an opposite effect).
In particular, the effect of simplified, more rule-like opinions that might result from stepification is
uncertain and perhaps worthy of empirical study.
295
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3. Excessive Control of Lower Courts
Finally, it is worth touching upon a downside associated with one of the
aforementioned advantages of stepification.299 While stepification is a potent
way to control lower court discretion, it may impede the development of
diversity in the lower courts, controlling them too much. That is, the inverse
of the observation about the benefits of control can also be made.
In some cases, we might prefer nonuniformity at the lower court levels.
More amorphous tests may allow local judgments or norms to creep into
judgment in a positive way. For example, preserving probable cause as an
inquiry that looks to the totality of the circumstances may enable local courts
to make localized judgments free from rigid frameworks articulated by
appellate courts. 300 Without romanticizing localized judgments, there are
many legal inquiries that benefit from freedom to tailor results to the
community.301 A more structured version of law is an advantage in certain
situations. Yet this form of control has drawbacks. Resolution of cases at one
step or another concentrates thoughts on those efforts rather than bringing
the entire issue into focus.
This point is susceptible to the counter that amorphous balancing tests
are no different for the purposes of developing the law. To the extent that
cases involving balancing are read broadly or used to reduce the inquiry in
practice to a single factor then the result may be no different.302 But as long
as judges are willing to read precedent as a guide for the application of
principles and not just of a resolution to individual cases, there may still be
an advantage obtained by balancing approaches. Courts that are freed of
analytical shackles may develop parts of the law that will otherwise not be
reached by more limited analyses, thereby spurring further development.303
299

See supra Section IV.A.
Cf. Coenen, supra note 248, at 689 (arguing that limits on adding structure to standards empower
trial courts at the expense of appellate tribunals).
301 For example, the totality-of-the-circumstances standard for informant tips may properly allow
judges to consider local conditions more effectively when considering whether tips are reliable enough
to create probable cause. See supra Section III.C.
302 For example, Professor Beebe’s analysis suggest that this is sometimes the case. See supra notes
247–250 and accompanying text.
303 For example, some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision to allow courts
of appeals to find that a right was not clearly established without deciding whether a violation of the
constitution occurred has led to decrease in the development of constitutional law. See Hughes, supra
note 257, at 428 & n.121; Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 95 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1797, 1827 (2018) (“Indeed, courts are far more likely to grant qualified immunity motions
without ruling on the underlying constitutional claim—a practice that increases constitutional stagnation,
not innovation.”). A move to balancing tests might have a similar effect to preventing courts from
skipping steps. By forcing courts to address all factors they might develop jurisprudence on parts of the
analysis they might otherwise skip over. But see Beebe, supra note 247, at 1586–87 (finding that judges
still gloss over certain factors when employing balancing tests for trademark infringement).
300
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To some extent, the evaluation of this aspect of step tests will turn on
the degree to which one agrees with the prior arguments about their flattening
of normative issues. If step tests separate issues that belong together, then
the development of the issue framed in the first step over the one relegated
to the second may be troubling. The answer to this concern is unlikely to be
global; in some cases, the weight will be appropriately placed on one factor
while the others are limited in their importance as stand-alone issues. But in
cases where the nature of the steps is more fraught, the balance may shift.
Further, in cases where a more rigid form of uniformity is undesirable,
we may prefer to abandon step tests. While the multistep approach may lead
to a type of formal uniformity, it does so at the risk of preventing lower court
judges from acting to fit the law to conditions on the ground. Indeed, in some
cases, this tailoring might lead to greater substantive uniformity as the law
incorporates and fits local judgments to produce the desired outcome.
Whether this is desirable is a case-by-case and doctrine-by-doctrine decision.
Still, inhibition of pluralism in favor of rigid uniformity can be a cost of
multistep approaches.
Above, control of lower courts was cited as a benefit of steps, and I do
not wish to abandon that claim. Rather, my goal is to highlight that this
benefit comes with a cost. The simplification, and therefore control, offered
by steps may also come at the expense of the development offered by lower
courts. Steps can channel inquiry into one area—limiting development of
others—and also focus intellectual firepower at one issue among many.
Thus, steps are no panacea to the problem of judicial discretion.
*

*

*

This cost–benefit analysis is admittedly difficult and critically context
dependent. As a result, the question of stepification’s overall merit is one of
judgment, rather than some ironclad conclusion one way or the other.
Nevertheless, two central lessons follow from the preceding analysis. The
first is that, as a broad matter, we should be more suspicious of stepification
than perhaps some legal actors are. While the move towards more rigid
inquiries may seem to advance the degree to which our law is lawlike, it also
may obscure the underlying values the law is attempting to capture. This shift
might be justified based on courts’ institutional competencies, and indeed
the litigants in the partisan gerrymandering cases argued just that.304 But we

304
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should not immediately equate workability with the notion that a given
inquiry captures the values the law is intending to advance.305
Second, stepification should be thought of as a transsubstantive issue in
jurisprudence that explains the connection between various doctrinal
difficulties. While there are certainly limits to a transsubstantive approach,
to the extent that stepification is a trend within American law, that trend
deserves interrogation. We should not be so quick to equate a trend that
seems like a natural evolution for the law with the values that we necessarily
want the law to embody. Stepification is a valuable legal tool, but it, like
other doctrinal technologies, comes with certain drawbacks. And indeed, in
some cases these drawbacks are fatal to step tests over time, leading to their
modification and potential collapse. This is the issue to which the next Part
turns.
V. THE LIFE AND DEATH OF STEPIFICATIONS
This last Part aims to accomplish two goals. The first is to offer a
hypothesis about the death of stepified regimes. Much of this Article has
been dedicated to chronicling the rise of stepification and why it replaced
older analytical modes. In light of the factors discussed in Part IV, one must
ask when the faults of stepification outweigh its benefits. Having addressed
this question, the second Section then attempts to sketch out alternatives to
stepification. This endeavor is even more tentative than the first as it is
difficult to break out of established modes of judicial lawmaking. Still, I aim
to make the first moves towards other models that could replace multistep
tests when they break down.
A. The Life Cycle of Step Tests
My normative critiques of stepification and the case studies suggest a
tentative further conclusion: there is a life cycle of stepification. While some
implicit stepification is necessary for the law to operate, 306 explicit
articulations like Lemon or Chevron that operate in highly contested areas of
the law are often fragile and prone to tinkering or collapse as a result of their
form. The aim of this final Part is to offer a brief theory of the deterioration
of stepifications over time.
The main observation is that where stepification operates in
normatively fraught areas, the tests that it produces are under constant
strain.307 This is because such tests often simplify the deep normative content
305
306
307

Or, if we should, we should more explicitly make this argument.
See supra Section I.B.
Schauer, supra note 36, at 804–05.
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of the law. 308 In particular, in hard cases, the factors that multistep tests
assume to be separate bleed into each other, and therefore a straightforward
application of the test will lead to results that seem at odds with what the law
requires. This leads to the pressure to modify the test to account for these
difficulties.
Here, the Chevron example is again instructive. While Chevron works
well for easy cases, in harder ones it is markedly less successful, and the
Court has slowly abrogated it over time. 309 This is precisely because, in
certain cases, the Court has been confronted by issues for which the
framework is poorly suited. Where these cases are particularly fraught, step
tests encounter difficulties and can break down over time. This process is
depicted in Figure 5:
FIGURE 5: EVOLUTION OF CHEVRON OVER TIME310
Change 1: Should this be for agencies to decide?
1. Is the statute ambiguous?
2. Is the agency
interpretation reasonable?

becomes

1. Is the statute ambiguous?
2. Is the agency interpretation
reasonable?
3. Is this a major question?

Change 2: When is the agency interpreting?
1. Is the statute ambiguous?
2. Is the agency
interpretation reasonable?
3. Is this a major question?

becomes

0. Is Chevron implicated?
1. Is the statute ambiguous?
2. Is the agency interpretation
reasonable?
3. Is this a major question?

Change 3: What is ambiguity?
0. Is Chevron implicated?
1. Is the statute ambiguous?
2. Is the agency
interpretation reasonable?
3. Is this a major question?

308

becomes

?

See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section III.A.
310 Change 1 represents FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–61 (2000).
Change 2 represents United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001), and Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). Change 3 is a hypothetical future case.
309
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As Figure 5 shows, as the test has encountered difficult cases over time,
the Court has had to adjust it by adding more and more steps and
modifications to accommodate the underlying form of what the Court thinks
the law should be.311 I would argue that this is what happened to Auer as a
majority of the Court added further steps to constrain a doctrine that some
thought had transferred too much power to agencies. 312 In particular, the
evolution of Chevron seems to suggest that a majority of the Court believes
that a literal reading of the doctrine would apply it to too many agency
actions, requiring the Court to add new steps that tell lower courts not to
apply Chevron to both minor agency actions313 and major ones.314 This is not
necessarily a bad thing, as we want the law to adjust over time. It does
suggest, however, that stepification is an imperfect way to conclusively
resolve issues even in cases in which the steps are relatively clear. 315
Stepification may not conclusively resolve issues, but it may provide a useful
vehicle for effecting the necessary changes.
A similar, though less dramatic, tendency can be observed in the
qualified immunity cases. Over time, the Court deviated from the mandatory
nature of the two-step inquiry in response to critiques of that regime.316 The
excessive rigidity of the regime led to its abandonment, and though Pearson
nominally left the two steps in place, commentators have observed that
courts have in practice often focused on only one of the two (perhaps to the
detriment of the development of constitutional law).317 And yet the doctrine
is still attacked by commentators who accuse it of policy failings318 as well
as a lack of fidelity to the common law in which it originated.319 The Court
may therefore be pressed to once again reconsider the two-step test,

311 People certainly can find reasons to disagree with any one of these decisions or doctrinal moves.
In each case, it was a majority of the Court that thought an adjustment was needed to constrain the result
of a straightforward application of the previous doctrine.
312 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 172–176 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.
315 This is in contrast to the Miranda example above where the addition of steps was in response to
the need to elaborate the decision’s vague terms. See supra notes 278–284 and accompanying text.
316 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009) (“Lower court judges, who have had the task of
applying the Saucier rule on a regular basis for the past eight years, have not been reticent in their criticism
of Saucier’s ‘rigid order of battle.’” (citation omitted)).
317 Hughes, supra note 257, at 428 & n.121.
318 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 303, 1798–1800 (“If the Court did find an appropriate case to
reconsider qualified immunity, and took seriously available evidence about qualified immunity’s
historical precedents and current operation, the Court could not justify the continued existence of the
doctrine in its current form.”).
319 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 45 (2018).
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potentially jettisoning it or adding additional steps to attempt to liberalize the
doctrine while still preserving it as a shield for particular officials.
Note, it is unclear whether multistep tests actually occur more in
normatively fraught areas. While high-profile tests take this form, I am
unable to conclude that this is the case. Certainly, Chevron, qualified
immunity, and strict scrutiny (and the tiers of scrutiny more generally) are
important doctrinal frameworks that have taken this form. I hypothesize that
it is normatively fraught areas where appellate courts value the enhanced
control over lower courts provided by these frameworks to bring order to
issues in which judges may be particularly tempted to reach results in line
with their political priors.320
Thus, a more difficult question is whether multistep tests are more
prevalent in normatively fraught areas of the law. As the data in the
Appendix shows within a sample of cases, the majority of multistep tests are
not found in highly contested areas. At the same time, such a simple reading
of the analysis would miss the point. It may be the case that a greater
proportion of normatively fraught areas are stepified. While an empirical
confirmation of this point would be difficult, it does seem to be the case
anecdotally. The application of the tiers of scrutiny, Chevron (and its
relatives), and qualified immunity all continue to be important issues. It may
be that multistep tests are particularly attractive for appellate courts in these
areas because of the simplification of appellate review and the more
structured analysis these tests offer to lower courts.
Of course, the fact that the Supreme Court (and many circuit courts)
both decides cases and articulates doctrinal tests makes it necessary to think
carefully about how to provide optimal guidance to lower tribunals in our
multilevel system. 321 Justice Scalia advocated that higher courts should
articulate holdings in a way that was more rule-like, rather than conferring
discretion on lower courts by crafting narrow holdings that offered minimal
guidance for future cases.322 Stepification can therefore be seen as an attempt
by judges to introduce some of the rule-like qualities that Justice Scalia
advocated for in cases where the law does not admit the articulation of a true

320

See supra Section IV.A.
See Scalia, supra note 128, at 1177 (“[T]he modern reality, at least, is that when the Supreme
Court of the federal system, or of one of the state systems, decides a case, not merely the outcome of that
decision, but the mode of analysis that it applies will thereafter be followed by the lower courts within
that system, and even by that supreme court itself.”).
322 Id. at 1178. Justice Scalia emphasized that his approach here was partially driven by the fact that
the Supreme Court (and many state supreme courts) only review a fraction of lower court decisions. Id.
321
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bright-line holding. 323 But then, as the multistep test faces real-world
complications, judges must attempt to rescue its rule-like quality by adding
ever more innovations.
My broader hypothesis is that such systems, when put under enough
pressure, eventually collapse; we are likely to see some of these systems
collapse in the near future. One notable example of such a collapse occurred
at the state level in the Oregon Supreme Court. In 1993, the Oregon Supreme
Court announced a new three-step framework for all statutory interpretation
in the case of Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries
(PGE). 324 The PGE case put forward a framework with ordered steps to
evaluate the meaning of a statute.325 The courts in Oregon then followed the
method as a matter of stare decisis for sixteen years. The regime, however,
eventually gave way when the legislature acted to displace the regime by
allowing courts to consider legislative history at the first step of the
analysis.326 In reconsidering the stepified test, the court pointed to the views
of the sponsor of the bill, who had argued that the old methodology was too
harsh.327 Rephrased in the language of this Article: the steps of PGE were a
poor fit for what the legislature thought the underlying nature of the
normative issue was, and it therefore acted to re-norm the issue. Notably, the
legislature chose not to reconsider or reinforce the steps of the test, but to
discard steps altogether. The court interpreted the legislature as rejecting the

323 Cf. id. at 1187 (acknowledging that the “totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes
of analysis [are] with us forever” but encouraging “that those modes of analysis be avoided where
possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows”).
As far as I can tell, Justice Scalia never transformed his skepticism of balancing into an endorsement of
multistep tests as such, but his language here suggests that he would have frequently preferred the
additional structure they offered compared to the abstract balancing of factors.
324 859 P.2d 1143, 1145–47 (Or. 1993), superseded by statute, 2001 Or. Laws ch. 438, as recognized
in State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009) (en banc). For a discussion of the case and its role in
interpretation in the state, see Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1775–85 (2010).
325 Roughly speaking, the framework looked at the text of the statute with respect to ordinary
meaning and within the context of the statute and other provisions both within the statute and in related
statutes. PGE, 859 P.2d at 1146. “If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and
context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history to
inform the court’s inquiry into legislative intent.” Id. “If, after consideration of text, context, and
legislative history, the intent of the legislature remains unclear, then the court may resort to general
maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving the remaining uncertainty.” Id.
326 See Gaines, 206 P.3d at 1047–48.
327 Id. at 1048. For another critique of the case, see Robert M. Wilsey, Comment, Paltry, General &
Eclectic: Why the Oregon Supreme Court Should Scrap PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Industries,
44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 663 (2008) (“[T]he PGE paradigm, for all its pretense to regularity, has in
fact become a distraction from the court’s work of construing statutes.”).
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notion that there could be a strict hierarchy of sources in favor of a view that
raised all sources to the same level.328
Likewise, one might worry that other multistep frameworks will
eventually collapse under the weight of their own particular infirmities. This
is especially so in cases in which the regulated actors have significant
incentives to push against the boundaries of what is allowed by the test.
Restated, the hypothesis could be that where hard cases are more likely to
arise, stepified regimes are more likely to buckle under a weight they cannot
bear.
This phenomenon mirrors what Professors Jeremy Kessler and David
Pozen have observed in the case of legal theories. Professors Kessler and
Pozen argue that legal theories gradually “work themselves impure” over
time.329 They argue that because the theory proves unable to actually secure
the values that spurred its creation in the first place, it must be modified to
“fix” these issues. 330 This process of refinement gradually becomes selfdefeating.
The same phenomenon is observed with stepifications. They arise to
manage a particular process and are sometimes advanced as a solution to the
chaos bred by the previous regime.331 As Professor Frederick Schauer argues
when discussing the conversion of standards into rules, the imposition of
rigidity into decisions may be perceived as a way to improve decisions and
rescue them from the problems created when confronted with too many
degrees of freedom. 332 But breakdown ensues when the proposed
formalization cannot accurately capture the issue in question, similar to what
Professors Kessler and Pozen observe for legal theories.
I do not mean to imply that this process is somehow unique to multistep
tests. The balancing tests they replaced, for example, can be thought to have
collapsed themselves. It is possible that stepification and the associated
historical trends are just part of a larger cycle of doctrinal development and
collapse. Further, multifactor balancing tests themselves can become
unwieldy as more and more factors are added to them, to the point where
they become meaningless or collapse to a small group of factors in practice.
At the same time, the rigidity of the multistep regime may make it more
brittle. One downside of balancing tests can be the perception that they allow
328

Gaines, 206 P.3d at 1048.
Kessler & Pozen, supra note 37, at 1838.
330 Id. at 1839 (“Through an iterative process of contestation and reformulation, the theories become
increasingly unmoored from the goals that were articulated to justify their adoption, adrift from their
raisons d’être.”).
331 See supra Section II.D.
332 Schauer, supra note 36, at 811–13.
329
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the judge to eventually just reach their desired normative conclusion via
manipulation of the relevant factors. But it is this feature that potentially
makes these tests more robust to challenges. That is, the ability to warp the
factors at the margin allows the judge to resolve hard cases in a way that is
“just” but still “fits” with the test. To the extent multistep tests box judges in
rhetorically, the end result may be for the test to collapse rather than for
judges to continually reach results they feel are unjust.
This is not a one-size-fits-all theory. There are real benefits to
stepification, and where those benefits significantly outweigh the harms,
stepification need not break down over time. For example, in the
gerrymandering context, a multiprong test such as the one advanced by the
appellees in Common Cause v. Rucho and Benisek v. Lamone may represent
the best way to adjudicate most of the claims that we care about without
excessive entanglement of the courts and politics (even if that best way is
ultimately not good enough).333 To the extent this is the case, stepifications
may persist over time as second-best solutions to a particular issue that invite
discontent at the margins without movement to depart from the test in
general.
In instances in which stepification is merely a device to codify a
normative intuition and to make cases easier, its benefits will be less clear.
Where the stakes of hard cases are low, there will likely be little issue, though
specific parties themselves may feel aggrieved by particular losses. Still,
there will be little pressure to change the regime to deal with these minor
cases. Where the hard cases matter more, there will be pressure to add
additional steps to the theory over time, slowly limiting its domain or carving
it apart with additional rules or exceptions.
This is not an indictment of this form of legal decision-making. Rather,
the observation that these regimes tend to erode over time illustrates the
reality of their costs. The issues are real and are considered by courts over
time. They often lead to the abandonment of stepification. In this context,
the transformation observed earlier is not an end point but rather part of a
life cycle of jurisprudence that gradually mutates.
B. After Steps?
The question then is not whether multistep tests should be discarded,
but how to more thoughtfully deploy and craft them to better fit the subject
areas they address.
One option would be to add a catchall step in certain tests to better
classify issues that arise at the boundary of the test. For example, those who
333

See supra Section III.D.
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believe that the Lemon test is ill-suited to handle long-standing monuments
could add an additional step that counsels the court to disregard the results
of the inquiry if the question is close and the result would require ending a
long-standing practice. Similarly, the Supreme Court could modify the
qualified immunity inquiry such that if the plaintiff is able to nearly make
the showing that the law was “clearly established” but the constitutional
violation was significant enough, that the court could override the results of
the test.
Both these proposals allow courts an off-ramp in a case in which the
test is narrowly met or failed but the result may conflict with the normative
goals of the doctrine. Notably, both proposals allow the court to keep the
general doctrine intact for most cases while providing an escape valve for
cases the doctrine gets wrong. The general test could then still help make
easy cases easy without inadvertently resolving too many hard cases in the
wrong way. Appellate courts could potentially caution lower courts against
using these tools to override the results of ordinary cases and reserve their
use for special cases that are appealed.334
Adding this additional level of flexibility might allow courts to
eliminate the worst issues of multistep rigidity without disrupting its main
benefits. This shift would require judges to acknowledge that some cases
cannot be resolved via a neat doctrinal framework and that exceptions to the
rule do exist. This change might undercut some of the legitimacy benefits
that stepification confers. Still, the change may be worth it to limit other
contortions that such hard cases might require.
In general, multistep tests are not always normatively fraught and may
have important benefits for courts looking to create uniformity in a doctrinal
area. It may further be the case that some process of doctrinal collapse and
renewal will always occur in those areas of the law with the highest stakes
and the toughest cases. The question should not be what will come after
multistep tests but where to deploy them to achieve maximum effect and how
to craft them such that their drawbacks are limited. This Section aims to
provide one sketch of how to address some of those issues, but I am sure that
there is further work to be done to craft even better improvements.
CONCLUSION
The central aim of this Article has been to bring the historical and
normative dimensions of stepification into view. Once stepification is

334 This could, in essence, allow the highest relevant court to withhold the power to override the
result of the test to itself, dictating methods for the lower courts while itself not following those impulses.
Such an approach presents other interesting questions of judicial candor and its normative implications.
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understood as a transdoctrinal phenomenon, its interesting historical
pedigree as well as its transsubstantive implications can be understood. This
Article suggests that stepification might not be as positive as it initially
appears. Rather, the use of multistep tests seems most easily justified by
institutional concerns within the judiciary rather than by an appeal to the
normative values of the area of law the test is aiming to summarize. The
process of stepification may not be an attempt to capture the precise
normative content of an issue but rather a concession to the reality that other
considerations sometimes make imperfect doctrinal representations the best
courts can do. As such, while something may be gained from stepification,
something is also lost. Thus, the case for stepification is, at best, uneasy.
APPENDIX: SAMPLE OF MULTISTEP TESTS
This Appendix aims to provide the reader with a sense of the diversity
of multistep tests that are in use by the judiciary today. To this end, I searched
for and examined relevant opinions published by the federal courts between
2010 and 2014.335 There were 2,210 of these cases. I then took a random
sample of 100 cases and analyzed what test was being used and the number
of steps.336 The remainder of this Appendix consists of those cases and the
categorizations I assigned them.
Some top-line results seem worth highlighting. Of the sample, thirteen
cases out of 100 were qualified immunity cases, and three were Chevron
cases. The only other test with three occurrences was an analysis of whether
there was personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts. Additionally,
three other cases analyzed the question of personal jurisdiction using a
multistep test—one related to a foreign defendant in a federal question case
and two related to a state long-arm statute—these cases, however, use
essentially the same test looking first to the state long-arm statute and then
to whether due process prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction. Finally, six tests
in the sample were actually dictated by statute or regulation rather than by
judges. While the number is not large enough to lead me to conclude that
stepification is illusory, it does suggest that in some cases it has been dictated
by other sources and that the numbers described above should not be taken
literally, but rather as suggestive of the general volume of multistep tests.
As usual, the search term is “opinion((TWO or THREE) /1 (STEP or PRONG!) /1 (TEST or INQUIRY)).”
This sample was taken on March 5, 2020. As of July 24, 2021, Lexis contains 2,212 qualifying cases from
this time period, almost identical to when the sample was taken.
336 One case’s publication status was ambiguous, so it was randomly replaced. This suggests that
some of the counts above may be a little overinclusive for reasons other than those discussed earlier, but
I see no reason to believe the top-line results are affected as the results are again intended to be suggestive.
In particular, the couple cases I was able to find with this error were tax court cases; Lexis seems to be
able to perfectly sort district court and appellate court cases.
335
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TABLE A1: RANDOM SAMPLE OF 100 CASES
Case
N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. Hous. Auth.,
68 F. Supp. 3d 545, 553–54 (D.N.J. 2014)
Nev. Prop. 1 LLC v. D’Amico (In re D’Amico),
509 B.R. 550, 556–57 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
Foley v. Kiely, 602 F.3d 28, 31–32 (1st Cir.
2010)
United States v. Mendoza-Trujillo, 46 F. Supp.
3d 1204, 1223 (D. Utah 2014)
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387–88
(4th Cir. 2010)
Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union
No. 27 v. E.P. Donnelly, Inc., 737 F.3d 879, 888,
891–92 (3d Cir. 2013)
United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 369 (5th
Cir. 2012)
FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 144,
147–48 (2011), vacated, 680 F.3d 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)
Red River Res. Inc. v. Wickford, Inc., 443 B.R.
74, 82 (E.D. Tex. 2010)
Dorchen/Martin Assocs. v. Brook of Cheboygan,
Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 607, 611 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
Garden Meadow, Inc. v. Smart Solar, Inc., 24 F.
Supp. 3d 1201, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 2014)
United States v. Rausch, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1192,
1199–1200 (D. Colo. 2010)
DCFS USA, LLC v. District of Columbia, 803 F.
Supp. 2d 29, 43 (D.D.C. 2011)
Smith v. Fenty, 684 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C.
2010)
Océ N. Am., Inc. v. MCS Servs., 748 F. Supp.
2d 481, 488–89 (D. Md. 2010)
Ndaba v. Obama, 697 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77
(D.D.C. 2010)

Steps
2

2

Short Description
Withdrawal from
ERISA pension plan
Willful and malicious
injury by bankruptcy
debtor

Type
Judicial

Judicial

2

Was a stop an arrest?

Judicial

2

Was a stop an arrest?

Judicial

2

Vulnerable victim

Statutory or
regulatory

3 and
2

Violation of labor
law and unfair labor
practice337

Judicial

2

Venue

Judicial

2
2
2
2
2
2 and
2
2
2
3

Third-party
beneficiary to
government contract
Temporary cessation
of production
Substantial similarity
in copyright claim
Substantial similarity
in copyright claim
Substantial question
in appeal
Stating a claim for
municipal liability
and due process
Stating a claim for
municipal liability
State copyright claim
preemption
Standing

Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial

337 This was one of several cases in which the court applied two separate multistep tests. It first
applied a three-step test to determine whether § 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act had been
violated and then applied a two-step test to determine whether maintaining a lawsuit constituted an unfair
labor practice.
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Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp.,
75 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
Myers v. Colvin, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1169
(W.D. Wash. 2013)
Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1221
(W.D. Wash. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Mahoney v.
Sessions, 871 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2017)
Koolen v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
953 F. Supp. 2d 348, 351 (D.R.I. 2013)
Veneruso v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood
Health Ctr., 933 F. Supp. 2d 613, 632 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), aff’d, 586 F. App’x 604 (2d Cir. 2014)
Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 693 F. Supp. 2d
767, 780 (N.D. Ohio 2010)
Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In
re Rodriguez), 517 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2014)
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
723 F.3d 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2013)
Wilson v. Jara, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1289,
1302 (D.N.M. 2011), aff’d, 512 F. App’x 841
(10th Cir. 2013)
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 606, 611 (7th
Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir.
2012)
Bouchard v. Whetstone, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1352,
1356–57 (D. Colo. 2011)
Brown v. Benefield, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1172–73 (M.D. Ala. 2010)
Clements–Jeffrey v. City of Springfield, 810 F.
Supp. 2d 857, 868 (S.D. Ohio 2011)
Evans v. City of San Diego, 913 F. Supp. 2d
986, 995–96 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
Hoover v. Walsh, 682 F.3d 481, 492 (6th Cir.
2012)

Stepification
Steps
2
5

Short Description
Standard for
injunction
Social Security Act
disability
determination

Type
Judicial
Statutory or
regulatory

2

Second Amendment
rights

Judicial

3

Res judicata

Judicial

2
3
2

2
2 and
2

Removal under
28 U.S.C.
§ 1444(a)(2)
Reliable and
admissible diagnosis
Reasonable
attorney’s fees for
out-of-town counsel
“Rational reason” not
to apply Michigan
law
Qualified immunity
and exigency for
warrantless entry

Judicial
Judicial
Judicial

Judicial

Judicial

2 and
2

Qualified immunity
and Bivens claims

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

3

Qualified
immunity338

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

338 Stepification in action! The Brown court added a third step to the familiar qualified immunity
inquiry: before considering whether defendant violated a constitutional right and whether that right was
clearly established, the court asked whether the defendant was acting within his authorized discretionary
authority. Perhaps the court should have framed its first step as a step zero as in Chevron.
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Case
Oyarzo v. Tuolumne Fire Dist., 955 F. Supp. 2d
1038, 1082–83 (E.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Oyarzo v. Turner, 641 F.
App’x 700 (9th Cir. 2015)
Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir.
2014)
Rush v. City of Mansfield, 771 F. Supp. 2d 827,
835 (N.D. Ohio 2011)
Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir.
2013)
Weeks v. Hodges, 871 F. Supp. 2d 811, 826
(N.D. Ind. 2012)
Whitney v. City of Milan, 677 F.3d 292, 296
(6th Cir. 2012)
Campbell v. Miller, 835 F. Supp. 2d 458, 471
(S.D. Ohio 2011)
United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 565 (3d
Cir. 2010)
Park Ave. Radiologists, P.C. v. Melnick (In re
Park Ave. Radiologists, P.C.), 450 B.R. 461, 466
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
United States v. Becker, 636 F.3d 402, 405–06
(8th Cir. 2011)
United States v. Chhun, 744 F.3d 1110, 1121
(9th Cir. 2014)
Carpenters Dist. Council of Kan. City Pension
Fund v. JNL Constr. Co., 596 F.3d 491, 494 (8th
Cir. 2010)
Herman v. YellowPages.com, LLC., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1030–31 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
McCarthy v. Yamaha Motor Mfg. Corp., 994 F.
Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2014)
Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv.
Sec., LLC, 460 B.R. 106, 116–17, 122 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Sec. Inv. Prot.
Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.), 474 B.R. 76
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)
craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F.
Supp. 2d 1039, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
Thomas v. Skrip, 876 F. Supp. 2d 788, 794–95
(S.D. Miss. 2012)
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Steps

Short Description

Type

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2

Qualified immunity

Judicial

2
3
2
4
3

2

2
2

2 and
2

3
2

Procedural due
process rights
Probable cause to
search for drugs
Postconfirmation
subject matter
jurisdiction
Plain error in
sentencing
Plain error in jury
instructions
Piercing the
corporate veil
Personal jurisdiction:
state long-arm statute
Personal jurisdiction:
state long-arm statute
Personal jurisdiction:
minimum contacts
and enjoining foreign
action
Personal jurisdiction:
minimum contacts
Personal jurisdiction:
minimum contacts

Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial
Judicial

Judicial

Judicial
Judicial

Judicial

Judicial
Judicial
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Case
WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.,
776 F. Supp. 2d 342, 352 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding A.Ş.,
750 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2014)
Corning Gilbert, Inc. v. United States, 37 Ct.
Int’l Trade 155, 164–65 (2013)
N5 Techs. LLC v. Capital One N.A., 56 F. Supp.
3d 755, 760 (E.D. Va. 2014)
Genusa v. Asbestos Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 773,
784 (M.D. La. 2014)
Mercier v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 795, 798
(2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 786 F.3d 971
(Fed. Cir. 2015)
In re Fullenkamp, 477 B.R. 826, 831 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2011)
Loveridge v. Barlow (In re Tebbs), 488 B.R.
729, 732 (D. Utah 2013)
George Fam. Tr. ex rel. George v. United States,
97 Fed. Cl. 625, 630 (2011)
United States v. McManaman
673 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2012)
Moore v. Beard, 42 F. Supp. 3d 624, 633 (M.D.
Pa. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Moore v. Sec’y Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 640 F. App’x 159 (3d Cir. 2016)
Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir.
2010)
Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 638 F.3d
223, 229–30 (3d Cir. 2011)
Frank Sawyer Tr. of May 1992 v. Comm’r,
107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1316, 1318–19 (T.C. 2014),
supplemented by 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1621
Shannahan v. IRS, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1273–
74 (W.D. Wash. 2010), aff’d, 672 F.3d 1142 (9th
Cir. 2012)
Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Com., 968 F. Supp. 2d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2013)
Corbett v. Duerring, 780 F. Supp. 2d 486, 492
(S.D. W. Va. 2011)
Wysocki v. Crump, 838 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767
(C.D. Ill. 2011)

Stepification
Steps
3
2

Short Description
Personal jurisdiction:
minimum contacts
Personal jurisdiction:
foreign defendant in
federal question case

Type
Judicial
Judicial

2

Patent infringement

Judicial

2

Patent infringement

Judicial

2

Original jurisdiction:
connection test

Judicial

2

Money-mandating
law or regulation

Judicial

2

May a debtor in
possession employ an
attorney?

Statutory or
regulatory

2

Is party a transferee?

Judicial

2

Inverse
condemnation

Judicial

2

Inevitable discovery

Judicial

2

Ineffective assistance
of counsel

Judicial

2
3

Ineffective assistance
of counsel
Immigration:
corroborating
evidence

Judicial
Judicial

2

Fraudulent corporate
transfer

Judicial

2

FOIA: summary
judgment

Judicial

2

FOIA: fee waiver

Statutory or
regulatory

3
3

First Amendment:
retaliation
First Amendment:
retaliation

Judicial
Judicial
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Case
McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 520 (9th
Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S.
721 (2011)
Garcia v. United States, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1133,
1139 (D.N.M. 2010)
Wenzel v. Sand Canyon Corp., 841 F. Supp. 2d
463, 474 (D. Mass 2012), abrogated by Culhane
v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282 (1st
Cir. 2013)
Mich. Self-Insurers’ Sec. Fund v. DPH Holdings
Corp. (In re DPH Holdings Corp.), 434 B.R. 77,
82 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Ind. Fam. &
Soc. Servs. Admin., Saint Catherine Hosp. of
Ind., LLC (In re Saint Catherine Hosp. of Ind.,
LLC), 511 B.R. 117, 123–24 (S.D. Ind. 2014),
rev’d sub nom. Saint Catherine Hosp. of Ind.,
LLC v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin.,
800 F.3d 312 (2015)
Doe v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.
2012), amended by Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores,
L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012)
Meikle v. Olsen (In re Olsen), 522 B.R. 294, 325
(Bankr. D. Mont.)
Williams v. California, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1009,
1022 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1002 (9th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
Wright v. La. Corrugated Prods., LLC, 59 F.
Supp. 3d 767, 776 (W.D. La. 2014)
John Muir Health v. Cement Masons Health &
Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal., 69 F. Supp. 3d
1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
Ali v. Kasprenski, 732 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446 (D.
Del. 2010)

Steps

Short Description

Type

2

First Amendment
protection

Judicial

2

Federal Tort Claims
Act: discretionary
function

Judicial

2

Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19

Statutory or
regulatory

2

Excusable neglect

Judicial

2

Exception to
preference payment

Statutory or
regulatory

2

Exception to
mootness

Judicial

2

Exception for
discharge of debt

Judicial

3

Establishment Clause

Judicial

2

ERISA preemption of
state law related to
health-benefit plan

Judicial

2

ERISA preemption of
cause of action

Judicial

2

NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue,
665 F.3d 464, 476–77 (3d Cir. 2011)

3

Goodson v. Maggi, 797 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631
(W.D. Pa. 2011)

2

460

Eighth Amendment:
use of force
Disparate impact
under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of
1964
Dismissal of claim

Judicial

Judicial

Judicial

116:383 (2021)
Case
Hall v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 265 F.R.D. 356,
361–62 (N.D. Ind. 2010)

Stepification
Steps
2

United States v. Bran, 950 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871
(E.D. Va. 2013)

2

EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C.,
731 F.3d 444, 462 (5th Cir. 2013)

2

Metro Bank v. Kessler (In re Kessler), 430 B.R.
155, 161 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010)
Pure Wafer, Inc. v. City of Prescott, 14 F. Supp.
3d 1279, 1297–98 (D. Ariz. 2014), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Pure Wafer Inc. v.
Prescott, City of, 845 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2017)
L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd., 850 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012)
Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,
623 F.3d 175, 185–86 (3d Cir. 2010)
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 23 F. Supp.
3d 631, 640 (N.D. W. Va. 2014), rev’d, 594 F.
App’x 791 (4th Cir.)
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d
34, 49 (D.D.C. 2011)
Gernsbacher v. Campbell (In re Equip. Equity
Holdings, Inc.), 491 B.R. 792, 848–49 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2013)

2

Short Description
Discovery outside the
administrative record
Deportation of aliens
with information
relevant to defense
Defense to vicarious
employmentdiscrimination
liability
Core jurisdiction of
bankruptcy court

Type
Judicial
Judicial

Judicial

Judicial

3

Contract Clause

Judicial

2

Content-based
challenge to
independent
educational plan

Judicial

2

Chevron

Judicial

2

Chevron

Judicial

2

Chevron

Judicial

2

Characterization of
shareholder loans

Judicial

Shaw v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 91 Fed. Cl. 715, 719 (2010)

3

City Line Candy & Tobacco Corp. v. Comm’r,
141 T.C. 414, 424–25 (2013), aff’d, 624 F.
App’x 784 (2d Cir. 2015)

2

Eurand, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc. (In re
Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended–
Release Capsule Pat. Litig.), 676 F.3d 1063,
1085 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

2

Causation in off-table
claim for Vaccine
Act
Calculating gross
receipts for purposes
of the small-reseller
exception
Best mode disclosure
violation

Judicial

Judicial

Judicial
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Case
Inventio AG v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Ams.
Corp., 5 F. Supp. 3d 665, 675 (D. Del. 2013),
clarified by No.08-874-RGA, 2014 WL 554853
(D. Del. 2014)
Klestadt & Winters, LLP v. Cangelosi, 672 F.3d
809, 817 (9th Cir. 2012)
United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483, 488
(5th Cir. 2010)

Steps

Short Description

Type

2

Best mode disclosure
violation

Judicial

3
2

Appealable
interlocutory orders
Admissibility of prior
wrongs
Admissibility of
identification
testimony

Judicial
Judicial

United States v. Salomon-Mendez, 992 F. Supp.
2d 340, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)

2

Johnson v. Bd. of Trs., 666 F.3d 561, 564–65
(9th Cir. 2011)

2

ADA disability

Judicial

Draper v. Martin, 664 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.
2011)

2

Accrual date for
42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims

Judicial

2

Abuse of discretion
in bankruptcy court

Judicial

2

Abuse of discretion
in bankruptcy court

Judicial

Ellsworth v. Lifescape Med. Assocs., P.C. (In re
Ellsworth), 455 B.R. 904, 914 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2011)
Rediger Inv. Corp. v. H Granados Commc’ns,
Inc. (In re H Granados Commc’ns, Inc.),
503 B.R. 726, 731–32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013)
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Judicial

